



Harness Your Internet Activity

# Zeroing in On Zero Days DNS OARC Spring 2014

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# Nominum Data Sources

- Worldwide ISP DNS data
  - ~Terabyte of data per day
  - Rough estimate 5% of ISPs resolver traffic
  - Activity from around the world, including China
  - Limited response data
  - Lots of other data sources – various threat feeds etc

# Have You Been Seeing This?


krsfwzohwdghqx.liebiao.800fy.com.  
wxctkzubkb.liebiao.800fy.com.  
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uv.liebiao.800fy.com.  
ivatsnkb.liebiao.800fy.com.  
wfmlgzyrufaxid.liebiao.800fy.com.  
qzgziliv.liebiao.800fy.com.  
qxgtqfyv.liebiao.800fy.com.

# Interesting Recent Trend

## Pseudo Random Subdomain Attacks

- First observed Jan 2014
- ~950 names attacked
  - 1 - 2 day spikes
  - Queries observed at resolvers worldwide
  - Queries start and stop about the same time worldwide
- Usually one more label than a resolvable domain
  - First label random, but often follows a pattern
  - Millions - tens of millions of randomized subdomains
  - Auth servers often fail, if they stay up they usually give back NXDOMAIN
  - Recently we also see NODATA, NOERROR returned
- Mostly very low normal daily query volumes, from within China
  - Predominantly Chinese gaming & adult sites, some exceptions
- IPs sending attack-related queries strongly correlated with Open DNS Proxies or Resolvers

# Uptick in Unique Names



# Characteristics of Target Names

- Some names w/high Alexa rank
- Chinese gaming sites
  - evidence suggests some reside on hacked legit sites
- Adult content
- UK gaming site

# Alexa Data for Attacked Names

<u>Name under attack</u> <u>Alexa rank</u>	<u>"Core" name</u>	
baidu.com.	baidu.com	5
blog.sina.com.cn.	sina.com.cn	13
xlscq.blog.163.com.	163.com	30
www.bet365.com.	bet365.com	179
www.appledaily.com.tw. 915	appledaily.com.tw	
hk.apple.nextmedia.com.	nextmedia.com	2017
nextmedia.com.	nextmedia.com	2017
tw.nextmedia.com.	nextmedia.com	2017
1.92xin.sinaapp.com. 4786	sinaapp.com	
applevideo.edgesuite.net. 5579	edgesuite.net	

7% of names attacked in Alexa 1M

Some very high ranking


92% of names have never been in Alexa 1M

Data was normalized to reflect different ranks over time

# Resolver Impact

## Recursion Contexts by Time


Sat, 08 Mar 2014 00:00:00 GMT to Wed, 07 May 2014 00:00:00 GMT



# Resolver Impact

## CPU Usage by Time (Averaged over Servers)

Sat, 08 Mar 2014 00:00:00 GMT to Wed, 07 May 2014 00:00:00 GMT



# Attack Distribution # Days

## Mar 10 – May 6 2014

% domains attacked	Cumulative %	Total domains attacked	Days domain attacked
71.9%	71.9%	373	1
18.7%	90.6%	97	2
3.5%	94.0%	18	3
2.5%	96.5%	13	4
1.5%	98.1%	8	5
0.6%	98.7%	3	6
0.4%	99.0%	2	7
0.4%	99.4%	2	8
0.4%	99.8%	2	9
0.2%	100.0%	1	17

# Top Ten Names Used

## Ranked by days used

2.1%	2.1%	17	www.500sf.com.
1.1%	3.3%	9	www.yuerengu.com.cn.
1.1%	4.4%	9	liebiao.800fy.com.
1.0%	5.4%	8	www.23us.com.
1.0%	6.4%	8	www.uc711.com.
0.9%	7.3%	7	wuyangairsoft.com.
0.9%	8.2%	7	web.pay1.cn.
0.8%	8.9%	6	www.zhaobjl.com.
0.8%	9.7%	6	978sf1111.ewc668.com.
0.8%	10.4%	6	vip.mia0pay.net.

# One Month Worldwide Activity For A Name

## liebiao800fy.com Mar 28-Apr 28 2014

month	day	queries	names
3	29	74945476	45045747
3	30	113542882	67604377
3	31	68961558	42379537
4	1	31279835	18210170
4	2	51596367	30243023
4	3	3532539	2316163
4	5	2	1
4	6	1	1
4	7	1	1
4	9	1	1
4	10	4	2
4	11	1	1
4	15	1	1
4	16	1	1
4	17	1	1
4	18	1	1
4	19	2	2
4	20	1	1
4	21	1	1
4	22	1	1
4	23	1	1
4	24	1	1
4	26	1	1
4	27	1	1
4	28	1	1

Several days with no activity


Very low activity

# Daily Query Pattern

## QPS for \*.800fy.com


March 29 00:00 GMT through Apr 3 00:00 GMT

one minute averages



# Matches with openresolverproject scans liebiao800fy.com 0326 and 0402

March 29 00:00 GMT through Apr 3 00:00 GMT



# Zeroing In On Zero Days

- Some success figuring out randomization algorithms
  - Detect spikes
  - Analyze subdomains
  - Known pattern?
    - Move to a monitor and block list
  - New pattern?
    - Monitor
- Enables very fast detection
  - New domains with familiar patterns - ~20 mins
  - New patterns - working on algorithms to automate
- We can add affected domains to block or monitor lists quickly
  - They get distributed instantly
- It will get harder - attackers will adapt

# Abrupt End to Major Attack Activity

- Is Chinese gov crackdown on certain kinds of web content responsible?



# What's The Motive?

Skirmishing among small  
game/adult site owners?



Testing and perfecting techniques  
for a bigger event?

# Your Friendly Neighborhood DDoS Service




## A *real* Chinese menu

# Your Friendly Neighborhood DDoS Service


Search Results				
	Thread / Author	Forum	Replies	Last Post [asc]
	Open DNS resolver lists (DNS Amplification lists) Astound	Appraisals and Pricing	0	12-03-2013 07:52 AM Last Post: Astound
	Open DNS resolver lists Astound	Premium Sellers Section	0	12-02-2013 05:46 PM Last Post: Astound
	Releasing my vb file to my Skype resolver with no Api as an open source pǎḡžē@	Hacking Tools and Programs	0	07-30-2013 07:20 PM Last Post: pǎḡžē@
	[HOT] RASBORA RESOLVER   NEW FREE PUBLIC SKYPE RESOLVER   OPEN TO EVERYONE   [HOT] ( 1 2 ) Rasbora	Free Services and Giveaways	16	04-18-2013 08:25 PM Last Post: Rasbora
	★ BATCH SKYPE RESOLVER! ★ [Open Source] ( 1 2 ) xZero	Batch, Shell, Dos, and Command Line Interpreters	15	09-23-2012 02:58 PM Last Post: Krew
	[OPEN] Online Skype IP Resolver - No Limits    No Registration    No public API    ( 1 2 3 4 5 ) MSI Afterburner	Free Services and Giveaways	46	08-31-2012 03:23 AM Last Post: Sulcid3B0y
Contact Us   Hack Forums   Lite (Archive) Mode   Staff   Awards   Legal Policies   Top				

<http://www.hackforums.net/search.php?action=results&sid=b4ba1426ad4820f75922f2444ab90254&sortby=lastpost&order=desc> Thu May 08 2014 15:16:06 GMT-0700 (UTC)


# Open DNS Proxies



# Open DNS Proxies Globally



# Other Uses for Random Subdomains




[www.ioactive.com](http://www.ioactive.com)

**Black Ops 2008:  
It's The End Of The Cache  
As We Know It  
Or: "64K Should Be Good Enough For  
Anyone"**

**Dan Kaminsky  
Director of Penetration Testing  
IOActive, Inc.**

# Interesting Tension



# A Perfect Storm?

- ✓ Open DNS proxies and resolve
  - ✓ Infra for sending fake queries
  - ✓ Lots of testing
  - ? Infra for sending fake answers
- 
- Minimally there's DDoS exposure
  - Potential cache poisoning exposure



# Way Forward

- Data! Logging is a “Good Thing”
  - We are starting to get response data
- Fast, automated detection
- Dynamic lists derived from fast detect
- Robust policy framework
- DNSSEC