

Why TAR for Resolvers

- Why use a TAR
 - The resolver operator outsources configuration
 - Easy for operator
 - **Trust** in the anchor selection
 - provide security
 - also managed properly (the zone 'works')
- Why **not** use a TAR
 - Root is signed
 - Concerns over malice or bad management
 - Denial of service
 - No timely updates of key material
 - No availability of TAR contents

How to use a TAR

- TAR is allowed to configure resolver
 - Trust anchors
 - **Domain-insecure** statements
 - “Ignore DNSSEC here; treat as insecure”
 - Like unknown algorithm keys in the DS
- End user may want to use multiple TARs
 - default add up trusted keys
 - TARs have keys for same name
 - Use all keys together, any one will do
 - Fix conflicts between TARs
 - Too much work: outsource the merge to a TAR

TAR key is the new Secure Entry Point

- TAR key must be as strong as contents
 - As secure as the DNSSEC keys
 - Gives idea of acceptable key size
 - Support TAR key rollover by resolver and TAR
 - Like 5011 on dlv.isc.org DNSKEY
 - Or **tar-key-list** that is signed by all PGP keys
 - » 5011 or 1ofN on TAR-key
- HTTPS for TAR protection has problems
 - Cycle in DNS->TLS->DNS dependencies
 - Certificates not rolled over
 - 1024b cert to protect 2048b .gov would not be smart