Quantifying the Impact of DNSSEC Misconfiguration

Casey Deccio

Sandia National Laboratories

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Availability and security



- DNS must be both ***available*** and ***accurate***
- DNSSEC is a security retrofit
  - DNSSEC increases maintenance complexity
  - Troubleshooting is difficult
- Misconfigurations abound, rendering name resolution unavailable

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Objectives

- Establish model and metrics for assessing availability of DNSSEC deployments
- Quantify complexity that may increase potential for DNSSEC misconfiguration
- Introduce techniques to mitigate effects of misconfiguration



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Outline

- DNSSEC availability model
- DNS complexity analysis
- Misconfiguration mitigation
- Summary

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Classes of DNSSEC misconfiguration

- Zone misconfigurations
  - Missing, expired, or bogus RRSIG
  - Missing DNSKEYs
- Delegation misconfigurations
  - No DNSKEY in child matching any DS in parent
  - Missing NSEC RRs for insecure delegation
- Trust anchor misconfiguration
  - Stale trust anchor at resolver

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Failure potential

- Probability of bogus validation
- Based on fraction of responsive authoritative servers serving bogus or incomplete data
  - Resolvers will retry if server non-responsive
  - Not all servers will retry if server responds with bogus data
- Assumption: resolver queries any authoritative server with equal probability

$$P_f(z) = \frac{|bogus\_servers|}{|responsive\_servers|}$$



recursive/validating resolver

authoritative server

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Failure potential

- Formula extends to chain of trust in ancestor zones
- Failure potential of each zone is combined independently of one another

$$P_f^r(z) = 1 - \prod_{i=z}^{anchor} (1 - P_f(i))$$



DNSSEC Deployment Survey



- Polled ~1500 production signed zones over a six-week period
- Recorded validation errors resulting from misconfiguration

Statistic	Value
Production signed zones polled	1,456
Total misconfigurations resulting in certain failure	194
Zone-class misconfigurations	134 (69%)
Delegation-class errors resulting in certain failure	60 (31%)
Errors (any class) caused by misconfigured ancestor zones	61 (31%)

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Failure Potential of Zones



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

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Complexity analysis

- Complexity creates potential for misconfiguration
- Hierarchical complexity:
  - Size of ancestry (zone depth)
- Administrative complexity:
  - Servers administered by distinct organizations



Hierarchical reduction potential



- If ancestry might reasonably be consolidated, what is the reduction?
- Ancestry reduced, but original namespace can be preserved



$$HRP = \frac{|orig\_zones| - |consolidated\_zones|}{|orig\_zones|}$$

$$= 0.25$$

Administrative Complexity



- How diverse is the set of organizations administering a zone?
- Complexity measured by random sampling (with replacement) of authoritative servers to determine the probability that two organizations are selected



$$AC = 1 - \sum_{o \in orgs} \left(\frac{|\, servers(o) \,|}{|\, all\_servers \,|} \right)^2$$

$$= 0.5$$

Hierarchical Reduction Potential



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Administrative complexity



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

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Avoiding and mitigating effects of misconfiguration

- Follow best practice operational standards (RFCs)
  - Key rollover procedures
  - Trust anchor rollover procedures
- Validation diligence
  - Resolver keeps trying alternative authoritative servers to find valid response
  - Optimality can be difficult – where is the break in the chain?
  - Implemented in BIND 9

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Soft anchoring

- DNSKEYs typically don't change often
- Resolvers configured with "hard" (traditional) trust anchors
- "Soft" anchors are derived from DNSKEYs authenticated from existing hard anchors



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Impact of soft anchoring

- Resolution not inhibited by:
  - zone-class misconfigurations in ancestry
  - delegation-class misconfigurations



Maintaining soft anchors



- Resolvers follow procedure similar to that used for rolling hard trust anchors (RFC 5011)
- Resolver periodically polls soft anchor zone
- Soft anchor addition:
  - Newly authenticated DNSKEYs persist for “hold down” period
  - New DNSKEY seen with corresponding DS
- Soft anchor removal:
  - Delegation to soft anchor made insecure
  - DNSKEY is revoked
  - DNSKEY and its DS RR are removed

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Soft anchoring limitations



- Doesn’t help when misconfigurations are at or below the bottom “link” in the chain of trust
- Resolver must have authenticated soft anchors through valid chain of trust before misconfiguration
- Scalability
  - Maintenance overhead of all trust anchors may be intense
  - Least-recently used policy may help

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

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- DNS responses must be both accurate and available
- DNSSEC deployment requires careful deployment and maintenance
- Soft anchoring can mitigate effects of misconfiguration



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Acknowledgements



- Jeff Sedayao, Krishna Kant at Intel Corporation
- Prasant Mohapatra at UC Davis

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Questions?



- ctdecci@sandia.gov

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