



DNS Zone Merging

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

A Corner Case DNS Configuration

May facilitate DNS zone management

Concerns about DNS compatibility and security risks arise

A set of DNS servers may host many (largely small) zones falling into the same parent zone


- Each zone is individually configured in the conf file
- Complicate conf file management: a single zone update triggers conf file change
- Complicate zone file management: zone content update is located in varied zone file
- Server synchronization needs additional mechanism besides XFR
- Slow startup speed: many complaints about BIND 9 on this until an optimization method is released in July



A simple idea: merge the zones into one?

- The aggregated zone must be the parent zone to embrace all subzones
- Equivalent to rewriting a zone below the delegation of its apex
- The zone contains all subzones' records along with the SOA and NS records at the apex except for all subzones' SOA records
- Configure the parent zone in the conf file
- Possible conflicts with DNS specifications?

DNS servers



a single hosted zone

```
$ORIGIN test.  
@ SOA. ...  
@ NS dns  
dns A ...  
spam NS dns.cnnic  
www.spam A ...  
cnnic NS dns.cnnic  
www.cnnic A ...  
dns.cnnic A ...
```

Merge all subzones into test.!

From the perspective of the DNS server:

- It believes itself serves the authoritative parent zone
- So when queries from the resolver arrives, it response just as the authoritative server as the parent zone

Only queries for the subzones can be directed to it due to the corresponding delegations in the parent zone

If applicable:

- A single zone is configured in the conf file
- Easy conf file management: conf file remains stable regardless of zone update
- Easy zone file management: all zone content updates are located in one zone file
- Easy server synchronization: XFR is enough
- Fast startup: minimized zone file amounts

Possible conflicts with DNS specifications:

- The subzone' s SOA and NS records are missing from the authority section of response which may be not expected by the resolver
- How does the resolver explain it? Or can the resolver accept it?

As viewed from an individual authoritative server, zone configurations and zone content are compliant to DNS specifications, the test is only necessary for the resolver implementation.

Authoritative zone file configuration (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

parent zone

```
$ORIGIN test.  
  
@      IN  SOA  ...  
  
@      IN  NS   dns  
  
dns    IN  A    218.241.108.65  
  
spam   IN  NS   dns.cnic  
  
cnic   IN  NS   dns.cnic  
  
dns.cnic  IN  A    218.241.108.66  
  
cnic2   IN  A    218.241.108.66
```

merged child zones

```
$ORIGIN test.  
  
@      IN  SOA  ...  
  
@      IN  NS   dns  
  
dns    IN  A    218.241.108.66  
  
spam   IN  NS   dns.cnic  
cnic   IN  NS   dns.cnic  
  
dns.cnic  IN  A    218.241.108.66  
www.spam  IN  A    218.241.108.66  
www.cnic  IN  A    218.241.108.66
```

dig +trace results show the DNS resolution path

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

dig www.cnnic.test +trace

```
.           3582  IN    NS    dns.  
;; Received 49 bytes from 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74) in 0 ms
```

```
test.       3600  IN    NS    dns.test.  
;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.64#53(dns) in 0 ms
```

```
cnnic.test. 5      IN    NS    dns.cnnic.test.  
;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.65#53(dns.test) in 0 ms
```

```
www.cnnic.test. 3     IN    A     218.241.108.66  
test.         3     IN    NS    dns.test.  
;; Received 82 bytes from 218.241.108.66#53(dns.cnnic.test) in 0 ms
```

Delegation

Authoritative response?

BIND resolver can successfully return all pertinent records

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

```
dig www.cnnic.test
```

```
:: ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 6181  
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1,  
ADDITIONAL: 0
```

```
:: QUESTION SECTION:
```

```
;www.cnnic.test.          IN      A
```

```
:: ANSWER SECTION:
```

```
www.cnnic.test.      3      IN      A      218.241.108.66
```

```
:: AUTHORITY SECTION:
```

```
cnnic.test.          5      IN      NS      dns.cnnic.test.
```

```
:: Query time: 1 msec
```

```
:: SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)
```

*Synthesized from
the delegation*

dig +trace results show the DNS resolution path of a negative answer

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

```
dig ww1.cnnic.test +trace

.                3576  IN    NS    dns.
;; Received 49 bytes from 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74) in 0 ms

test.            3600  IN    NS    dns.test.
;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.64#53(dns) in 0 ms

cnnic.test.      5      IN    NS    dns.cnnic.test.
;; Received 66 bytes from 218.241.108.65#53(dns.test) in 0 ms

test.            3      IN    SOA   dns.test. cert.cnnic.test. 2 20 20 604800 3600
;; Received 76 bytes from 218.241.108.66#53(dns.cnnic.test) in 0 ms
```

Negative answer test: Nothing unusual except for the missing SOA record

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

```
dig ww1.cnnic.test

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 50985
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ww1.cnnic.test.          IN      A

;; Query time: 1 msec
;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)
;; WHEN: Tue Oct 18 09:55:56 2011
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 32
```

UNBOUND also supports, but without synthesized authority section

UNBOUND 1.2.0

```
dig www.cnnic.test

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 52082
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.cnnic.test.          IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.cnnic.test.         3       IN      A      218.241.108.66

;; Query time: 4 msec
;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)
```

UNBOUND supports negative response, but also without SOA record

UNBOUND 1.2.0

```
dig ww1.cnnic.test

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 13508
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ww1.cnnic.test.          IN      A

;; Query time: 1 msec
;; SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)
```

Does this configuration make it possible for the server administrator to compromise its parent zone?

```
$ORIGIN test.  
@      IN  SOA  ...  
@      IN  NS   dns  
dns    IN  A    218.241.108.66  
spam   IN  NS   dns.cnic  
cnic   IN  NS   dns.cnic  
dns.cnic IN A    218.241.108.66  
www.spam IN A    218.241.108.66  
www.cnic IN A    218.241.108.66
```

```
ww1.spam IN CNAME cnic2  
cnic2.   IN  A    218.241.108.65
```

Zone infringement!

Seemingly viable through parent zone rewriting, but how to link the subzone records in service to the residual space of the parent zone?

CNAME chain may do this!

- Configure a CNAME record to point to any record in the zone interested
- The response is sure to include the in-zone CNAME chain
- The only problem is whether the resolver would accept the CNAME chain

Authoritative response of the merged zone

```
dig @218.241.108.66 ww1.spam.test

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 13161
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ww1.spam.test.          IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
ww1.spam.test.          3      IN      CNAME   cnic2.test.
cnic2.test.              3      IN      A       218.241.108.65

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
test.                    3      IN      NS      dns.test.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
dns.test.                 3      IN      A       218.241.108.66

;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 218.241.108.66#53(218.241.108.66)
```

Different from the parent zone!

BIND resolver (BIND 9.6.1cn2-P1)

```
dig ww1.spam.test

;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 38370
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ww1.spam.test.          IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
ww1.spam.test.          3      IN      CNAME   cnnic2.test.
cnnic2.test.            5      IN      A       218.241.108.66

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
test.                   3600   IN      NS      dns.test.
```

From the parent zone!

UNBOUND 1.2.0

```
dig ww1.spam.test
```

```
:: ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 38296  
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
```

```
:: QUESTION SECTION:
```

```
;ww1.spam.test.      IN  A
```

```
:: ANSWER SECTION:
```

```
ww1.spam.test.      3   IN  CNAME cnic2.test.
```

```
cnic2.test.         5   IN  A     218.241.108.66
```

```
:: AUTHORITY SECTION:
```

```
test.               3600 IN  NS    dns.test.
```

From the parent zone!

```
:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:
```

```
dns.test.           3600 IN  A     218.241.108.65
```

```
:: Query time: 1 msec
```

```
:: SERVER: 218.241.108.74#53(218.241.108.74)
```

BIND and UNBOUND are not caught in the trap!

They do not accept the chained results as the final authoritative answer

The canonical name are queried in a dedicated separate request whose response is handle by the parent zone

A DNS zone merging method

Though possibly problematic in DNS compatibility, it does work in at least BIND and Unbound implementations

Parent zone compromise risks exist but are avoided by BIND and Unbound implementations



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