

Fixing .nz DNSKEY encoding Technical report

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Chronology

- 1) Detection: 9-Dec-2011
- 2)Follow-up: 12-Dec 2011
- 3)Investigation: 13-Dec-2011
- 4)Software Patch: 16-Dec-2011
- 5)Realization: 11-Jan-2012
- 6)Remediation: 9-Feb-2012
- 7) Deployment: 23-Feb-2012

1) Detection

- Phil Regnauld and Andy Linton in Vietnam
 - Why .nz DNSKEY doesn't look like the rest
 - Email message to NZNOG
 - DNSKEY is encoded differently

```
From: Andy Linton
Subject: [nznog] .nz zone DNSKEY

Is it just coincidence that the newly published DNSKEYs for .nz begin with the string BAABAA?

nz. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8
BAABAAGD+q3p2XDCb6SvAbACB/NPdljxhpBx209ZnvF20Yb6kViMJ5dg
xYDcFtvL5RW31Bc7UDvseoQPUK1wora3BtUTylo1xd5PN/lV600mrNGR
xfmw77Hen/MXH5GQrjaj0+rFP1xce1/jdyvCciJzrYRcPL9p4c/eGoJK 3ZMubiu10Q==
```

2) Follow-up

- Duane Wessels
 - Your DNSKEY seems to generate different DS with BIND

```
NZ KSK has keytag 2517 yet dnssec-dsfromkey gives a DS with keytag 54026

$ dig nz dnskey | grep 257 > nz.key

$ dnssec-dsfromkey nz.key

nz. IN DS 54026 8 1 CC0EFEDAA4AA09CFB05E72E765A97BD5A9BFD1FE

nz. IN DS 54026 8 2

48B0A194EE26C9D59BCC683CBC7A3495BB0AAA51ECC75533DBC76408 F0F70458
```

- Mark Andrews
 - Your DNSKEY is wrongly encoded, contains a leading zero in the exponent, violating RFC 3110 Section 3.2, fix it

3) Investigation

- The version of Opencryptoki in use passes to libhsm an leading 0
- Libhsm doesn't validate the key contains an extra 0, encodes it as is.

OpenDNSSEC

libHSM

OpenCryptoki (PKCS #11)

Sun Crypto Accelerator 6000

March 2012 Leading zero

4) Software patch

```
--- libhsm/src/libhsm.c 2011-03-19 03:56:02.000000000 +1300
+++ /home/sebastian/src/opendnssec-1.2.1/libhsm/src/libhsm.c
@ -1261,6 +1261,18 @
     return NULL:
+static void
+ remove leading zeroes(CK BYTE PTR data, CK ULONG *len)
+{
     CK BYTE PTR p = data;
+
     CK ULONG l = *len;
    while( 0 == (unsigned short int)(* p)) ++p, --l;
    memmove(data, p, l);
     *len = l;
+}
 static ldns rdf *
 hsm get key rdata(hsm ctx t *ctx, hsm session t *session,
                   const hsm key t *key)
@ -1327,6 +1339,9 @
         return NULL;
     }
    // Remove leading zeroes for the public exponent
     remove leading_zeroes(public_exponent, &public_exponent_len);
+
     data size = public_exponent_len + modulus_len + 1;
     if (public exponent len <= 256) {
         data = malloc(data size);
```

5) Realization

- Report from Comcast
 - Validation for .nz is not working, you have a problem, check dnsviz.net for diagnostics. We are disabling validation for .nz
- Reached Nominum for insight
- Conclusion: if we want to go ahead, we need to fix the DNSKEY

6) Remediation Plan

- Plan 1
 - Do a controlled manual KSK/ZSK rollover
 - Unusual: we are not changing the underlying keys, but their representation
 - Will need to feed old/new representation in the input zone

- Plan 2
 - Go unsigned
 - Deploy patched software
 - Clear status files
 - Re-sign
 - Test
 - Submit new DS

6) Deployment


- Go unsigned
 - Requested on 13-Feb
 - Completed on 16-Feb
- Deploy software
- Testing
- Submit new DS
 - Requested on 23-Feb
 - Completed on 26-Feb



Lessons learned

- Test using private implementation
 - We tested thoroughly using BIND/ldns
 - Thanks for Brian Wellington from Nominum for their help
- dnsviz.net didn't detect the wrong encoding
 - Notified Cassey Deccio
- IANA checks didn't detect the issue
 - Notified Kim Davies
- validns does detect the issue
- OpenDNSSEC devs very helpful
- Good response from IANA
 - DS removal triggered some alarms, manual verification was needed

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