



# DNSSEC Deployment in .CN

**DNS-OARC's 2014 Spring Workshop**

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

May 10, 2014





## U Popular protocol in DNS

- 563 TLDs in the root zone in total
- 378 TLDs are signed
- 367 TLDs have trust anchors published as DS records in Root
- 4 TLDs have trust anchors published in ISC's DLV Repository



Ø .CN is one of the signed zones from the beginning of August, 2013.






## Announced:

- Hardware & software deployment
- Training and drills

## DS in Root:

- Generation & submission
- Observations & verification



## Experimental:

- Risk analysis
- Software development

## Partial:

- Signing & roller
- Observations & verification

## Operational:

- Upgrades and improvements
- Debugging


## Key Information

- Algorithm and Key Length**

Key Type	Function	Algorithm	Length	NSEC/NSEC3
ZSK	Sign RRSET	RSA- SHA256	1024	NSEC3
KSK	Sign DNSKEY		2048	


- Key rolling cycle and RRSIG period**

Key Type	Period	Roll	Overlap	RRSIG Period
ZSK	100 day	90 day	10 day	30 day
KSK	13 month	12 month	30 day	



RFC 4641


RFC 6781



double-signature


## Key Pair management

- All pairs of keys are generated in HSM
- **5** key administrator accounts are generated during the HSM initialization process
- **More than half of them ( $\geq 3$ )** are needed for access




## Private Key protection

- An encrypted key is divided into **5 segments** and stored in independent smart cards, each kept by a key administrator
- In emergency case, the key can be restored by any **3 segments**



## Physical Security

- An electromagnetic shielding datacenter ( following GJBz20219-94 “C” level of PRC) is being used, and only authorized persons may access
- HSMs and hidden master servers are kept in the electro-magnetic shielding datacenter
- A backup system is established in disaster datacenter in Chengdu, with the same security insurance level as that of Beijing







### 1. SmartDNSSEC - Independent R & D Software (2010.1-2012.6)

#### Purpose:

- Automated deployment of DNSSEC


#### Core Value:

- Control key generation through HSM API
- Normal and emergency key rollover
- Support HSM signature
- Zone management: load/transfer/resign
- Emergency Management and Disaster Recovery



### 2. Internal simulation test (2010.12-2013.5)



- A close-loop simulating environment with root, TLD, SLD, recursive, SRS, whois, etc
- 5,600,000 names in .CN zone , 6,900,000 times of SRS update, 170,000 DS records submission by SLD
- Key rotation: ZSK 102 times, KSK 51 times
- 20+ bugs were fixed





### 3. Open test with ISPs in China (2012.1-2012.11)



- Main ISPs in China (China Telecom, China Unicom, China Mobile, CSTNET, CERNET) were covered
- Backbone: About **0.28%** can't support UDP packet larger than 512 bytes, **3.41%** with UDP packet size limitation policy. All these could be fixed by TCP.
- User side(Wireless, ADSL, LAN, etc.): **0.057%** DNSSEC query failure. All the failures were caused by network packet loss or latency, not by DNSSEC
- Conclusion: the Internet environment in China could **support** DNSSEC






### 4. Platform Upgrading (2012.1-2012.10)


- HSM: produced by an **industrially certified vendor**
- Server: memory upgrading, **16G → 32G**
- Router: **support EDNS0**
- Bandwidth: more for the increased length of data packet (**2.5 times**)






### Zone Signing

- u An **independent** hidden master system for DNSSEC was established
- u **.CN**, **.中国/中國** and **43 sub-domain** under .CN are signed by HSM clusters (Dual Active)
- u Signing **1000w** names less than **20** minutes
- u DNS services (without DNSSEC) is **on-line** for resolving, DNSSEC services is **off-line** for trial operation




### DNSSEC Services On-line

- U DNSSEC servers are proceeding on-line **node by node, step by step** (Switching, Validation, Analysis, then next Node)
- U **2 Backup system** (DNSSEC AXFR system and Non-DNSSEC IXFR system) to ensure the continuity of resolving services
- U Fast switching mechanism through **centralized** management (within **5 minutes, on authoritative server side**)



## DS Submitting

- Passed IANA's **validation** for DS Record of .CN and .中国/.中國
- DS becomes effective in **Nov. 26** in the root zone
- Validation through DNSSEC enabled recursive server
- The first **ZSK Rotation** has been finished in December, 2013 and the second rotation is in March, 2014 Smoothly
- The **first KSK Rotation** is coming in this year...







# 4、Monitoring and Observations


## Monitoring

### — Alarm

- WAN DNSSEC validation
- KEY synchronization
- SOA comparison
- Log checking
- VIP domain checking
- etc

### — Warning

- KEY rolling event
- DS event
- KEY re-generation
- etc





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## 4、Monitoring and Observations

### Observations

- **Zone Size**
  - Opt-out
  - **Increased a little (7%)**
- **Packet Size**
  - RRSIG
  - **2.5** times larger in average
- **68%** DNSSEC query in usual
- After sub-domain and recursive nameservers having been implemented DNSSEC, bandwidth costs will be **much larger**





## 4、Monitoring and Observations

### Observations

- Query Type in .CN (Rank)



1.	"-EDC"	36.25%
2.	"-ED"	30.74%
3.	"-"	24.59%
4.	SUM:	<b>96.13%</b>

- Query Type in .CN (DNSSEC Proportion)

– With DNSSEC	<b>67.94%</b>
– Without DNSSEC	32.06%

- The same as in China and Abroad

- Packet Size maybe increased to **542B**




## 4、Monitoring and Observations

### Observations

#### 2014.02.27 – a small size DDoS Attack

- QpS increased to **2.4** times larger
- Packet size increased to **700** Byte average (**1.65** times)
- Bandwidth reach **4** ( $2.4 \times 1.65$ ) times larger than usual



- 1) How to push **Second-tld** open DNSSEC?
- 2) How to push **Recursive** open DNSSEC?
- How to **face the pressure** after 1) and 2)?



*Thank you for your time!*

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