

Using TLS for DNS Privacy in Practice


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Using TLS for DNS Privacy in Practice

- Previous talk - Overview of privacy threats/solutions
- Focus here is
 - IETF efforts ([draft-ietf-dprive-dns-over-tls](#))
 - Implementations - TLS in practice
- Acknowledgements:
 - VerisignLabs
 - NLNetLabs
 - getdns team
 - USC/ISI...

DPRIVE WG



Pros and Cons

	Pros	Cons
STARTTLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Port 53• Known technique• Incrementation deployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Port 53 - middleboxes?• Existing TCP implementations• Downgrade attack on negotiation• Latency from negotiation
TLS (new port)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• New DNS port (no interference with port 53)• Existing implementations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• New port assignment
DTLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• UDP based• Certain performance aspects	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Truncation of DNS messages (just like UDP)<ul style="list-style-type: none">➡ Fallback to clear text or TLS✗ Can't be standalone solution• No running code

DNS-over-TCP

- DNS-over-TCP... historically used only as a fallback transport (TC=1, Zone transfer)
- RFC5966 (2010)
 - TCP a **requirement** for DNS implementations
- 2014: USC/ISI paper - Connection-oriented DNS
 - Showed TCP/TLS performance feasible for DNS

draft-ietf-dnsop-5966bis

- Performance (more later):
 - Connection-reuse & pipelining, response re-ordering
- Idle timeouts:
 - Historically clients did “*one-shot TCP*”
=>(conservative idle timeouts)
 - [edns-tcp-keepalive long-lived DNS-over-TCP sessions]
- Security/Robustness:
 - Historically server implementations were basic in TCP connection management (compare to other protocols)


Performance

Goals:

- Amortise cost of TCP/TLS setup
 - Send many messages efficiently
- Optimise TCP/TLS set up & handling


Performance

1. Client - Query pipelining



Performance

2. Server - concurrent processing of requests
sending of out of order responses



Performance

3. Reduce latency of **first** message on a connection

- TCP Fast Open ([RFC7413](#))
 - Cookie exchange: Send Data in SYN
 - Linux. [FreeBSD on the way]
- TLS Session Resumption ([RFC5077](#)) -Abbreviated handshake using session ticket
- [TLS False Start]

Performance

4. Other considerations (learn from e.g HTTPS):
 - Server connection management
 - Robustness and fair use
 - Idle time configuration (keepalive)
 - Under the hood - kernel tuning...

TLS in Practice

DNS-over-TLS history

- Production TLS in **Unbound** for DNSTrigger:
 - Unbound 1.4.14 (Dec 2011) !!Pre-dated DPRIVE-WG!!
 - Used to contact open resolver on port 443 (last resort).
- Since then... Prototyping work at **USC/ISI**
- More recently (since 2014)
 - LDNS and NSD TLS patches, BIND TCP improvements
 - **getdns - ongoing development of DNS-over-TLS**



- Modern **async DNSSEC** enabled API (<https://getdnsapi.net/>)
- Stub mode has flexible privacy policy
 - **TLS** (port 1021) with transport fallback:
 - * Strict (Authenticated) TLS only
 - * Opportunistic TLS
 - * Fallback to TCP, UDP
- Pipelining, OOOOP, Configurable idle time, keepalive (WIP), padding (WIP)

Current status

Software	digit	LDNS	getdns		Unbound		NSD	BIND
mode	client	client (drill)	stub	recursive*	server	client	server	server/client
TLS	Dark Green	Light Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Dark Green	Light Green	Grey
TFO	Dark Green	Light Green	Dark Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Grey
Conn reuse	Dark Green	Light Green	Dark Green	Grey	Dark Green	Grey	Dark Green	Dark Green
Pipelining	Dark Green	Grey	Dark Green	Yellow	Dark Green	Yellow	Dark Green	Dark Green
OOOP	Dark Green	Grey	Dark Green	Yellow	Dark Green	Yellow	Yellow	Dark Green


- Dark Green: Latest stable release supports this
- Light Green: Patch available
- Yellow: Patch in progress, or requires building a patched dependency
- Grey: Not applicable or not planned

* getdns uses libunbound in recursive mode

TLS Basics

1 RTT

1 RTT



TLS BCP

- UTA (Using TLS in Applications) WG produced RFC7525 this year - “BCP for TLS and DTLS”

- Key recommendations - Protocol versions:

But...
requires recent
OpenSSL

- **TLS v1.2** MUST be supported and preferred
- TLS v1.1 and v1.0 SHOULD NOT be used (exception is when higher version not available)
- SSL MUST NOT be used

DNS-over-TLS
is relatively
'green-field' -
could choose to
use 1.2 only

Aside: Cipher Suites

- Cipher Suite specifies combination of:
 - Key exchange/Authentication algorithms
 - Bulk encryption (symmetric) algorithm
 - MAC algorithm
- Recent attacks ([RFC7457](#))
- Forward secrecy for key exchange (DHE)


TLS BCP - Cipher Suites

- Recommended Cipher Suites (4 of ~100):
 - **TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256**
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

AEAD: Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
(Confidentiality, authenticity and integrity)

TLS BCP - Authentication

- Secure discovery of certificate/hostname/etc.
 - Indirect or Insecure methods MUST not be used
 - SNI MUST be supported
- DNS-over-TLS
 - Configuration profile
 - DANE (clear-text/un-authenticated TLS, boot strap problem)




But... some view CA's
as weak link

TLS implementations

- OpenSSL
- GnuTLS
- BoringSSL - Google fork of OpenSSL
- LibreSSL - OpenBSD fork of OpenSSL
- WolfSSL, Botan, NSS,.....

Examples



Next release:
Hostname verification

1.5.4

Scenario 1:

Strict TLS

- Configuration:
 - **Hostname verification required (Default)**
 - Correct hostname for Unbound resolver
 - TLS as only transport
- RESULT:
 - TLS used (cert & hostname verified)

Scenario 2:

Strict TLS

- Configuration:
 - Hostname verification required (Default)
 - **No or incorrect hostname**
 - TLS as only transport
- RESULT:
 - Query fails

Scenario 3:

Opportunistic TLS


- Configuration:
 - **Hostname verification optional**
 - Valid, none or incorrect hostname
 - TLS as only transport
- RESULT:
 - TLS used (hostname verification tried but fails)

Scenario 4:

Opportunistic TLS

- Configuration:
 - Hostname verification required (default)
 - Valid, none or incorrect hostname
 - **TLS with fallback to TCP**
- RESULT:
 - TLS used (hostname verification tried but fails)

Example



Scenario 3:

Opportunistic TLS

- Configuration:
 - Hostname verification required (default)
 - Valid, none or incorrect hostname
 - TLS with fallback to TCP
- RESULT:
 - TCP used (TLS tried, but fails)

TLS 1.3

- -08 of draft in progress in TLS WG. Major features:
 - 1-RTT handshake 😊 [0-RTT proposed]
 - Key establishment via (EC)DHE and/or PSK
 - Encryption of handshake messages (e.g. cert)
 - Remove cruft (stricter, simpler implementation)
- Also...TCPINC WG: TCPCrypt vs TLS bun-fight

Summary

- TCP/TLS performance is key
- Consider privacy policy
- Know your TLS BCP
- TLS 1.3 is coming