

What's In A Name?


Wes Hardaker, Haoyu Jiang
October 2019

<hardaker@isi.edu>




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2018 DITL data received at USC/ISI



2018 DITL data received at USC/ISI



Overview

- Research started by USC masters student Haoyu Jiang
- Data analyzed: B-Root's contributions to DITL 2018
- Results of breaking down DITL root traffic in new-ish ways:
 - By “chrome”
 - By language
 - By length
- Future Work

Chromes Effect On Root Server Traffic

- When chrome starts up, it generates 3 garbage queries
 - To detect “pay-walls” or other DNS rewriting

```
semantics {  
  sender: "Intranet Redirect Detector"  
  description:  
    "This component sends requests to three randomly generated, and "  
    "thus likely nonexistent, hostnames. If at least two redirect to "  
    "the same hostname, this suggests the ISP is hijacking NXDOMAIN, "  
    "and the omnibox should treat similar redirected navigations as "  
    "'failed' when deciding whether to prompt the user with a 'did you "  
    "mean to navigate' infobar for certain search inputs."  
  trigger: "On startup and when IP address of the computer changes."
```

Chromes Effect On Root Server Traffic


- When chrome starts up, it generates 3 garbage queries
 - To detect “pay-walls” or other DNS rewriting

```
// Start three fetchers on random hostnames.  
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {  
    std::string url_string("http://");  
    // We generate a random hostname with between 7 and 15 characters.  
    const int num_chars = base::RandInt(7, 15);  
    for (int j = 0; j < num_chars; ++j)  
        url_string += ('a' + base::RandInt(0, 'z' - 'a'));  
    GURL random_url(url_string + '/');
```


All these requests end up at the root

- But what to what effect?
- How much of the root traffic is garbage names?


Histogram of the length of records in the root zone




Requests received per single-label length




Requests received per single-label length




Total Traffic vs Multiple-Labels vs Single-Label vs Root Name




What are the *single-labels*?



Studying Single Labels by Common Languages




Machine Learning: Here's a label, what language is it?




Analyzing Traffic by Label Count


2018 DITL data received at USC/ISI



1-labels




The Low Count Labels: 1-6




The Low Count Labels: 1-6


Note: typically $1 > 3 > 4 > 2$




The Two Three Combo




The Two Three Combo



Top 25 right-hand 2-labels in and outside the event



Top 25 right-hand 2-labels in and outside the event




Results: DGA like queries to multiple TLDs


novartiscqmsumerheath.at.
service-novartisadvisory.tm.
noovarrtishealthh.tw.
initiat-ive-familien-ba-nde.tm.
iinitiiative-familienbannde.at.
novartis-c-ibavis-ion.tm.
sandozkerdiyolo1i.at.
wwwadidasgolfcomvn.at.
wwwsandozpolskainth.tm.
n-ova-rtisege-nvard.tm.
authorize.mynet.
sandozkarbjy0loji.at.
authorize.mynet.
sandozkarbjy0loji.at.
initiative--familien-ban-de.tw.
car-novartiseyecare.tw.

novartlseomsumerhealth.tm.
dealsconstellation-alcon.tm.
constellation-alconuser.tw.
novartlseomsumerhealth.tm.
dealsconstellation-alcon.tm.
constellation-alconuser.tw.
noovarrtishealth.tm.
novartis1ntarnationel.tw.
qswmhudwx.mynet.
wwwnovartiseyecarenetnz.tm.
qswmhudwx.mynet.
dvugmdn.mynet.
wwwnovartiseyecarenetnz.tm.
dvugmdn.mynet.
nov-a-r-tisinternational.tw.
novartjsconsumcrhea1th.tw.


Longer and Longer: 5-12



6 was afraid of 7...



(because 7...) 8 9



Length 8 and 9

- In 100k names:
 - openstacklocal 34434
 - local 15551
 - localdomain 6710
 - net 4804
 - virtual 4629
 - com 4073
 - internal 2920
 - LOCAL 2101

openstacklocal

AAAA IP.bogons.cymru.com.openstacklocal.

AAAA IP.badconf.rhsbl.sorbs.net.openstacklocal.

A IP.cblplus.anti-spam.org.cn.openstacklocal.

AAAA IP.rbl.interserver.net.openstacklocal.

AAAA IP.cbl.anti-spam.org.cn.openstacklocal.

A IP.dyna.spamrats.com.openstacklocal.

A IP.misc.dnsbl.sorbs.net.openstacklocal.


AAAA IP.cblplus.anti-spam.org.cn.openstacklocal.

A IP.dnsbl.rangers.eu.org.openstacklocal.


(99.7% of these were
from one ASN)

Note: real IPv4 → “IP”


11-labels




14-labels



20-labels




23-labels




Length 23 – 80% sophosxl.net

- 11% .arpa
- 80% sophosxl.net
 - 0.0.163.0.0.132.0.0.16.6.3.0.0.0.0.00.04.b2610633ea1476298c681f8016dd3d39d60c43f11c9cd75cfdb2ed7e011f14c.f.00.s.sophosxl.net.
 - 0.0.39d4.0.0.0.0.0.11b4.0.8d5.0.0.0.0.00.01.02660438680dbfa8e175d4b48ea1953b0cf91c694a2ea920280cf3d18f6b22a.f.00.s.sophosxl.net.
 - 0.0.7c.0.0.11.0.0.7.0.2.0.0.0.0.00.01.b2610633ea1476298c681f8016dd3d39d90f6b3ae45b1ef23bb11a5eae2d8da.f.00.s.sophosxl.net.
 - 0.0.76.0.0.61.0.0.2.5.0.0.0.0.5.06.04.61a4b12b2a9c745aaafaa74594443bcfb52a458e69b66f69c4a9948530c4754.f.06.s.sophosxl.net.


The Rabble




Near Life Expenctancy: 66-82



Late Bloomers




End of the Line: 103-122



End of the Line: 103-122

Let's end with a look at some of these oddballs



Length 66+ example three: 4%

- 40.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.115.111.97.112.114.100.45.114.111.45.103.101.116.109.101.109.98.101.114.118.51.45.49.50.49.49.52.95.112.111.111.108.21.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.[SNIP].12113.
- 44.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.111.108.110.112.114.100.50.45.103.101.116.109.101.109.98.101.114.99.111.117.110.116.101.114.115.45.49.57.48.49.48.95.112.111.111.108.21.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.[SNIP].19010.
- 40.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.119.119.119.46.104.97.114.118.97.114.100.112.105.108.103.114.105.109.45.108.98.114.45.57.52.48.49.95.112.111.111.108.20.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.[SNIP].9411.

Length 66+ example three: 4%

- 40.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.115.111.97.112.114.100.45.114.111.45.103.101.116.109.101.109.98.101.114.118.51.45.49.50.49.49.52.95.112.111.111.108.21.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.[SNIP].12113.
- 44.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.111.108.110.112.114.100.50.45.103.101.116.109.101.109.98.101.114.99.111.117.110.116.101.114.115.45.49.57.48.49.48.95.112.111.111.108.21.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.[SNIP].19010.
- 40.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.119.119.119.46.104.97.114.118.97.114.100.112.105.108.103.114.105.109.45.108.98.114.45.57.52.48.49.95.112.111.111.108.20.47.67.111.109.109.111.110.47.[SNIP].9411.

DOTTED ASCII???

Length 66+: example three decoded

- ,/Common/**soap**rd4-getmembercounters-16030_pool/Common/IP
- (/Common/**soap**rd-ro-getmemberv3-12114_pool/Common/IP
- +/Common/**soap**rd1-getmemberporttype-6693_pool/Common/IP

Conclusions and Future Directions

- Conclusion: So. Much. Bad. Code. / So. Much. Leakage.
- Better DNS name classification mechanisms
- Better analysis of temporal patterning
- Deeper dive into language studies

- Questions?