The Different Ways of Minimizing ANY

Observations on *Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to DNS Queries That Have QTYPE=ANY* (a.k.a. RFC 8482)

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Starting Points

- Why "Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to DNS Queries That Have QTYPE=ANY "?
- ⊙ A Measurement/Observation on its Impact
- ⊙ Surveying Implementations
- ⊙ Underlying Principles
- \odot The Need for Increasing Simplicity
- Relationship of Protocol Development, Code Development and Operations



Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to ... QTYPE=ANY (The set up)

⊙ QTYPE=ANY

- Benign: snooping on a domain name at an authoritative server
- Problematic: expecting multiple sets (A and AAAA) in one lookup
- Malicious: a message-size amplifier from a well-provisioned source
- Stop the bad use while softening the blow for the good use
 - Hard fails (RCODE="bad") drive traffic up or waste a round trip
 - DNS has no clear, polite response for "no!", especially "not anymore!"
 - $\circ\,$ Protocol developers tried to appease everyone

How does the document specify "saying no"

- \odot (4.1) Answer with a Subset of Available RRsets
 - $\circ\,$...MAY consist of a single RRset owned by the name specified in the QNAME
- (4.2) Answer with a Synthesized HINFO RRset
 If there is no CNAME present at the owner name matching the QNAME
- \odot (4.3) Answer with Best Guess as to Intention

Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to ... QTYPE=ANY (results)

- \odot Result in RFC 8482 (incomplete, out of context quotes):
 - (4.1)...This mechanism does not signal ... that an incomplete subset ... has been returned.
 - (4.2) A system that receives an HINFO response SHOULD NOT infer ..., it is not possible to tell with certainty whether the HINFO RRset received was synthesized.
 - (4.3) In some cases, it is possible to guess what the initiator wants in the answer (but not always).


Clarifying my "Complaint"

- It's good to limit or eliminate QTYPE=ANY and good to maintain backwards compatibility
- My concern is that the document does so by increasing non-determinism in the protocol
 - o Increasing complexity?
- Larger cloud overhead:
 - This isn't the only time this has happened
 - Overloading the meaning of RCODE=SERVFAIL (for DNSSEC)
 - Overloading the TXT record (SPF or TXT for mail)

How Has Minimizing ANY Played Out?

- A small experiment (17 Jan 2020) covering nameservers for the Top-Level Domain registries
 - For convenience, figuring TLD servers are well-managed resources
- 13,475 queries over UDP and 13,475 more over TCP
 For UDP: 260 contained a "minimized ANY answer" 10 Different Ways!
 For TCP: 251 contained a "minimized ANY answer" 9 Different Ways!
- Notes on these numbers: there is some double counting of "decisions" as some IP addresses behave the same way for multiple zones
 IP addresses behaved differently depending on the zone.


UDP Responses (1)




<u>13,475 Queries</u> **13,358 Responses** 117 No Response




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



TCP Responses (1)



<u>13,475 Queries</u> **13,309 Responses** 166 No Response







Drilling into the Numbers

- Value magnitudes are not terribly meaningful
 - Servers may share IP addresses and serve multiple TLDs
 - Hence double counting of what "large DNS operators" do
 - Looking at "denials" per IP address shows that some IP addresses alter their "way" of saying no
 - It is operator choice or implementation dependent?
 - Is it a per zone option or server option?
- ⊙ For at least one IP address
 - The way "no" is said differs from zone to zone

The "Big Four" Open Source Implementations

Implementation - UDP	Empty Answer	NS-only	Other only Types
Implementation 1	Yes (10)	Yes (5)	SOA(1)
Implementation 2	No	Yes (6)	
Implementation 3	Yes (4)	Yes (84)	DNSKEY(7), NSEC3PARAM (7), TXT (6), NSEC(5), MX(2), SOA(1)

Implementation - TCP	Empty Answer	NS-only	Other only Types
Implementation 1	Yes (10)	Yes (8)	
Implementation 2	No	Yes (3)	
Implementation 3	Yes (4)	Yes (87)	DNSKEY(8), NSEC3PARAM (7), TXT (6), NSEC(5), MX(2)

\odot Magnitudes are not terribly meaningful

How are NSD and BIND Configured?

⊙ NSD 4.2.3:

- o refuse-any: <yes or no>
 - ...sends truncation in response to UDP type ANY queries, and it allows TCP type ANY queries like normal... The default is no.

⊙ BIND 9.14.6:

o *minimal-any*

• over UDP, the server will reply with only one of the RRsets (first one found ... not necessarily the smallest...). The default is no.



How are Other Implementations Configured?

⊙ Knot and PowerDNS:

- Couldn't find documentation showing how to configure it
- $\circ\,$ Did find some email denying it is implemented

⊙ Observed Behaviors

- Don't seem to agree with the configuration documentation
- \circ or maybe the strings in "version.bind" aren't accurate

What Does This Mean?

 \odot I'm a bit baffled by this

- Can't see evidence that operators are making, or could make, the choices specified in the protocol modification document (RFC)
 - There is evidence of the synthesized HINFO option (but not from a server identifying its code base)
 - Don't see how servers respond differently based on QNAME (but they do)

Two Reasons Why This Bothers Me So

 \odot A principle of protocol design

⊙ Observation about levels of staff expertise

A Protocol Ought to be Described by a State Machine

- States of communication ought to be well known, understood, and secure on both sides of a channel
 - Definitive transitions between states based on transmissions and timeouts
 - Each side expects specific reaction(s) to its transmission
- \odot The DNS is already a poor model of this
 - In my younger days I tried to build a state machine and failed

How does this apply to my observations

- ⊙ I'm asking for QTYPE=ANY at TLD Apex names served by authoritative servers
 - $\circ\,$ I have an expectation of what will be there
 - SOA, NS
 - Maybe a set of DNSSEC record sets for NSEC3
 - Or maybe a set of DNSSEC record sets for NSEC
 - Maybe others
 - So far, I am able to detect when a server is minimizing ANY via other means
- ⊙ But in the general case (non apex), I can't tell clearly



Should I be able to detect a minimized ANY response?

\odot This is a fair question

- If I know what I want, it would be better to ask for it (in parallel)
- $\circ~$ The approach we have is pragmatic on many levels

But my concern is about the protocol design process For the sake of a state machine model, determinism is desired

In the long run, pragmatic short cuts lead to technical debt
 Perhaps we've lost the battle already

Another concern: Staff Expertise

\odot Based on an experience

- Network Operations Center staff mean skill level is trending down
 - Once had a staff member tell me "I don't know how to read a traceroute"
- We promote people, we expand staff, we grow coverage
- \circ It's inevitable
- ⊙ What should we do?
 - \circ Make the protocol simpler, not more complex
 - This enables better tooling, automation, etc.

Gaps

- Protocol Engineers describe ways software can be written, with an expectation that operators will be able to cope with that
 More general solutions, built around assumptions of operations
- Operators have a myriad of issues to juggle, with avoiding "tickets" of utmost importance
 - $\circ\,$ A need to lean on pre-packaged software to perform duties
- Software Developers are in the middle of this
 https://ietf.org/blog/herding-dns-camel/



Classic DevOps

Protocol Engineers
 Maximize Functionality

OperatorsMinimize Downtime

What Do We Do About This?

\odot As software developers

- $\circ\,$ Do what can be done to improve what comes out of the IETF
- Comment on documents describing protocol enhancements

\odot As operators

- At what cost "backwards compatibility?"
- Learn to deal with changed behaviors/changed defaults

\odot As researchers

- Quantify impact of protocol modifications
- $\circ\,$ Find the good so we can do more of that

Engage with ICANN

