

Not so fast!

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# TCP Fast Open?

*Stay Open.* **OX**

# Agenda

## Using TCP Fast Open

**01** Why TFO?

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**02** How does TFO work?

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**03** Implementing TFO as a server or client

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**04** TCO in practise: not so fast

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**05** Conclusions

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# TCP is becoming more important for DNS

- Larger responses: TXT, DNSSEC, EDNS options
- Enforcing of UDP buffer sizes

## Overhead of TCP is an issue

- Resource consumption on both client and server
- More packets exchanged to get an answer: increased latency

We will look into the last point: overcoming some of the extra latency by using TCP Fast Open (TFO)  
At the expense of some more resources used by both client and server

# What is TFO?


Main purpose: reducing some TCP overhead by exchanging less packets

Regular DNS query over TCP: 10 packets

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# TFO 1


Client has no cookie, but gets one for future use

Client indicates cookie support, server sends a cookie

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```
▼ TCP Option - TCP Fast Open
  Kind: TCP Fast Open Cookie (34)
  Length: 2
  Fast Open Cookie Request
  > TCP Option - No-Operation (NOP)
  > TCP Option - No-Operation (NOP)
  [Timestamps]
```

```
> TCP Option - No-Operation (NOP)
> TCP Option - Window scale: 7 (multiply by 1)
▼ TCP Option - TCP Fast Open
  Kind: TCP Fast Open Cookie (34)
  Length: 10
  Fast Open Cookie: 3f96ce05325cf023
  > TCP Option - No-Operation (NOP)
```


# TFO 2

Client has cookie, so we need only 8 packets

Client sends cookie, server accepts cookie  
Note the initial packet already has the query

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# Why the cryptographically secured cookie?

Not using it would open up a heavy form of SYN-flood attack

If the client can do it without proving it did a regular 3WHS before, it would open up the possibility to flood data into the application with SYN requests carrying data

Without TFO, the initial SYN can carry data, but it only gets fed into the app after the 3WHS completes.

A TFO SYN can carry data that immediately gets fed into the app, without having to wait for the 3WHS to complete

RFC 7413 goes into more details.

# Sketch of implementation in OS

Details in RFC 7413

## Server side

When a cookie is requested, generated one based on a secret and the client specifics

When a new connection with a cookie is coming in, accept it if it matches

Client side: request cookie if not in store

Save the received cookie, associating it with the the server

Use it (if available) when a new connection is made to the server

Also:

Handle graceful fallback to non-cookie mode

Cleanup old (server/client) cookies

# How about TFO support in the DNS world?

It seems pretty well supported by servers

- Most recursive and authoritative servers mention it in release notes
- Not always clear if it is on by default or an option
- For recursive servers it is not always clear if we're talking listening side or connection to auth side
- Stubs? Other clients? Also not very clear...



No results found for "**fastopen**".

PowerDNS Recursor already had the server side part, we're going to look at the client side mostly

# Server side

As easy as doing a single `setsockopt` call on the listening socket

But beware, the OS needs some settings as well to enable it

Both server side and client side TFO consume resources

```
sysctl net.ipv4.tcp.fastopen
```

Documented in <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/networking/ip-sysctl.html>

Linux has client side enabled by default, *but server side disabled*

*This means that on a default install TFO will not be offered to clients, even if it is enabled by the DNS server for on the listening socket*

# Client side

PowerDNS Recursor was lacking TFO for talking to authoritative servers (i.e. acting as a TCP client)

Enabling it client side can be done with a `send(2)` flag  
Alternatively before calling `connect(2)` by setting a socket option

```
setsockopt(s, TCP_FASTOPEN_CONNECT, &on, sizeof(on));
```

Connect calls will return `EINPROGRESS` if no cookie is available yet  
Little code changes (if your code already works with non-blocking sockets)  
Does not sound difficult at all.  
No real docs found, but the explanation with the PR into Linux explains how to use it...

# Hitting problems


Trying it using a command like tool on Quad8

It accepts the client cookie request and returns a cookie as show before, so try to use it for next request:

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Cookie is not accepted, a new one is sent causing a retransmission!

# Google's public DNS and TFO

- Quad8 is not the right DNS server to check TFO
- Sends cookies but does not accept them in most cases
- Assumption: cookie is only accepted if you hit the same (anycast) server, which can be forced by fixing the source port, but
- Fixing the source port is not the right thing to do

# There are solutions for (anycast) clusters

- Setting a system-wide TFO secret to be shared by cluster members  
(`sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen_key`)
- Use a socket option to set a socket specific TFO secret  
(`setsockopt(... TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY ...)`)
- Both not implemented at Quad8!
- This is a known issue since 2017 at Google: <https://issuetracker.google.com/68040969>
- Sad fact: both the TFO RFC and the Linux implementation originate from Google
- Also observed at Google's authoritative servers
- But: Google's DoT and DoH offer and accept TFO correctly

# Cloudflare, Quad9 and Authoritative servers?

- At time of writing, both 1.1.1.1 and 9.9.9.9 support TFO (only) for DoH

How about authoritative servers as found in the wild?

- Support by authoritative servers is rare
- In *DNS Privacy in Practice and Preparation*, Deccio & Davis mention between 1% (Alexa5000) and 3% (TLDs)
- This is data from 2019, it would be nice to repeat the study

# Testing is hard

Often TFO cookies would stop working

Captures showed that cookies received previously were not used for new connections  
Turns out that Linux is extremely conservative in the usage of TFO as a client

Some counters as shown by `netstat -s`:

```
$ netstat -s | grep TCPF
  TCPFastOpenActive: 1
  TCPFastOpenActiveFail: 3
  TCPFastOpenBlackhole: 1
```

There are a few more. I could not find documentation for these counters.  
But reading code showed that a single timeout on connect is already enough to stop using TFO for *all* client connections for `net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout_sec`, with exponential backoff to even longer periods. Default is 3600s...

Remedy: set the sysctl to a lower value, maybe even 0.

# Conclusions

TFO may be fast, but adoption is slow

- TFO is nice and not hard to implement from the application developer point of view, the OS does all the work
- Linux fails to document the socket options and counters properly, making it harder to deploy than necessary
- Docs for various DNS servers and client libs are also not clear most of the time
- Sadly, even a large party that should have all the resources and expertise fails to do it properly server side
- On the client side, a single mishap has big consequences: disabling TFO for a long time for all connections

These things need to change to increase TFO adoption.

## References

- Deccio and Davis: “DNS Privacy in Practice and Preparation”
- RFC 7413