

Observations on Botnet Traffic at Various Levels of the DNS Hierarchy

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Botnet Query Traffic

- This particular botnet generates DNS queries for thousands of second-level domains
 - · Large subset in .COM and .NET
- · Consistent and easily identifiable third-level labels
- Example
 - xxx.yyyyyyyy.\$tld
- Very even distribution of queries coming from recursive clients
- Query type: 99% A, and 0.5% AAAA
- We don't share the botnet's name here because remediation is still ongoing at other registries



Before Sinkholing



Botnet Query Traffic

- Generated about 375,000 queries per second (peak) to Verisign's .COM and .NET name servers
- Most botnet domains hadn't been registered, so most responses are NXDOMAIN
- A small number of domains were previously registered and delegated.
- Very even distribution of queries among botnet domains
 - i.e. all domains receive essentially the same rate of queries



Pre-delegation Traffic Levels



Typical Response

;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 63054 ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; AUTHORITY SECTION: com. <mark>900</mark> IN SOA a.gtld-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 1612827708 1800 900 604800 86400

;; Query time: 181 msec ;; SERVER: 192.33.14.30#53(192.33.14.30) ;; WHEN: Mon Feb 08 15:42:17 PST 2021 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 117



What Query Rate Might We Expect?

- About 71,000 unique three-label domain names
- With 900 sec negative caching TTL
- Worst case every source querying every three-label name every 900 seconds – that would average about 79 queries per second per source
- In the graph, each dot is one query source (IP address)
- 99% of clients are below 79 QPS (vertical line)





The Sinkhole



Domains Names Delegated to Sinkhole Name Servers

- Most domain names delegated to sinkhole
- A control group was left un-delegated
- Four dedicated sinkhole nameservers at three geographically distributed sites.
- 16 processor cores, 640GB Storage, 32GB RAM
- Ubuntu BIND 9.16.1
 - Configured with minimal responses
- DNS Statistics Collector¹ for data collection



Before and After

- After sinkholing, TLD query rates dropped by a factor of 35-40
 - From 225 to 6 QPS/domain
- On the sinkhole name servers, query are under 50 QPS/domain





Some Experiments



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Experiments

- The nature of this traffic affords us an opportunity to conduct some interesting research
- · How does response code affect caching and query rates?
- How does the presence of requested data affect caching and query rates?
- How do TTLs affect caching and query rates?
- · Use weekends to reset and change experiments



Types of Responses Studied

Description	RCODE	RRs in Answer?	TTL?
NOERROR / DATA	0	Yes	From Data
NOERROR / NODATA	0	No	From SOA
NXDOMAIN	3	No	From SOA
SERVFAIL	2	No	No
REFUSED	5	No	No



Different Types of Responses

- Responses with:
 - NOERROR / DATA
 - NOERROR / NODATA
 - NXDOMAIN
- All TTLs set to 24 hours
- NODATA and NXDOMAIN have identical query rates





NOERROR / DATA: TTL vs Query Rate

- The second-level authoritative zones are configured to return A and AAAA records for non-apex names
- Different domain name groups are given different TTLs
- · Shaded area represents daily range

TTL	SLD QPS
1 min	280
1 hour	68
1 day	34



* Extrapolated to all root server identities

How NOERROR/DATA QPS Varies Depending on TTL

NOERROR / NODATA: TTL vs Query Rate

- The second-level authoritative zones are configured to return NODATA for non-apex names
- Different domain name groups are given different TTLs
- Shaded area represents daily range

TTL	SLD QPS
1 min	295
1 hour	96
1 day	86



* Extrapolated to all root server identities

How NOERROR/NODATA QPS Varies Depending on TTL

NXDOMAIN: TTL vs Query Rate

- The second-level authoritative zones are configured to return NXDOMAIN for non-apex names
- Different domain name groups are given different TTLs
- Shaded area represents daily range

TTL	SLD QPS
1 min	286
1 hour	92
1 day	82



How NXDOMAIN QPS Varies Depending on TTL

* Extrapolated to all root server identities



Comparison of Response Types With TTLs



REFUSED

- Sinkhole name servers configured to return REFUSED for very small subset of domain names
- This is QPS per domain name
- Further investigation shows this is largely due to a small number of recursive operators.



SERVFAIL

- Sinkhole name servers configured to return SERVFAIL for very small subset of domain names
- This is QPS per domain name
- Further investigation shows this is largely due to a small number of recursive operators.



QPS for Domains configured to return SERVFAIL

* Extrapolated to all root server identities

Effect of 'minimal-responses' on Bandwidth

- With minimal-responses on, responses are only slightly larger than queries
 - Outgoing bandwidth slightly higher than incoming
- For two days we turned off minimal responses
- Response size and outgoing bandwidth approximately doubled





Key Observations

- No significant difference in caching of NXDOMAIN and NODATA negative responses
- For negative responses, TTLs longer than 1 hour don't make much difference
- For positive responses, TTLs longer than 2-4 hours don't make much difference
- REFUSED and SERVFAIL significantly amplify, rather than reduce query rates

Possible Future Experiments

- Measure effects of aggressive DNSSEC caching
- How quickly do changes to parent/TLD zone propagate?
- Differences between child / parent NS RRset





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