KEEPING UP WITH THE IETF DNSOP WG

OARC 35, May 7, 2021

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THE DNS UNIVERSE @ IETF

DOH 2017

DNSEXT 1999

DNSOP 1999

DANISH BoF 2021

DNSSD 2013

DANE 2010

ADD 2020

DPRIVE 2014



FINISHED WORK IN DNSOP @ IETF110

- Message digest for DNS zones (RFC 8976)
 - integrity of zone file and origin authenticity
 - use-cases: root zone, response policy zones, centralised zone data service (CDZS), ...
- DNS Server Cookies (RFC 9018)
 - lightweight DNS transaction security mechanism, update RFC 7873 for interoperability (anycast)
 - protect against amplification attack, forgery, offpath cache poisoning



ALMOST FINISHED WORK IN DNSOP (1)

Working Group Last Call

- Service binding and parameter specification via the DNS (DNS) SVCB and HTTPS RRs)
 - new type of records allowing a client to learn more about endpoint service before connecting
 - improve security, privacy and performance (and enable aliasing of apex domains)
- DNS Transport over TCP Operational Requirements
 - for DNS over unencrypted TCP, as well as over an encrypted TLS session




ALMOST FINISHED WORK IN DNSOP (2)

Close to WGLC

- Revised IANA Considerations for DNSSEC
 - updates RFC 5155 and RFC 6014, which have requirements for **DNSSEC** algorithms
 - motivation: relieving the need to make every national crypto algorithm an IETF standard just for DS records

Closed WGLC

- DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve Privacy, draft-ietf-dnsoprfc7816bis
- NSEC and NSEC3 TTLs and NSEC Aggressive Use



EXISTING DNSOP DRAFTS THAT NEED WORK

- DNS catalog zones
 - sync configuration from primary to secondary
 - generate zone file + XFR
 - questions to operators for use-cases
- DNS avoid fragmentation, max size interval?

Source	IPv4
RFC 4035 (MUST/SHOULD)	1220/4000
DNS Flag Day 2020	1232
Measuring DFD 2020	1472 (1500-20-8)

IPv6

1220/4000

1232 (1280-40-8)1452 (1500-40-8)



NEW WORK IN DNSOP


- NSEC3 Iteration Considerations
 - NSEC3 proof of non-existence, discorage zone enumeration
 - uses N iterations of a cryptographic hash, allows for the (optional) use of a salt
 - max limits set in RFC 5155
 - complex for authoritative engines, complex for validators: everyone suffers
- DNSSEC Automation
 - RFC 8901 Multi Signer DNSSEC Models
 - elegant insight using RFC 8901 for generic use-case changing NS operator for signed domains (without going insecure)

key size	old iterations	ne iterat
1024	150	10
2048	500	10
4096	2500	10






UPDATES FROM DPRIVE @ IETF110



ALMOST FINISHED WORK

• XFR-over-TLS (XoT) submitted to the IESG for publication



EXISTING WORK

- DNS-over-QUIC
 - \neq DoH with HTTP/3, QUIC is a transport layer
 - DoQ stub-resolver, resolver-authoritative discovery similar to DoT

implementation	language
CoreDNS	Go
AdGuard DNS proxy	Go
dnslookup	Go
AdGuard C++ DNS libs	C++
Quicdoc	С
aioquic	Python
Flamethrower	C++

DoQ implementation status (table copied from presentation by Sara Dickinson)

notes

AdGuard uses as DoQ server

Simply proxy server supporting DoQ

Command line utility wrapper for Adguard DNS proxy

AdGuard use in mobile app

Simple DoQ impl based on Picoquic

QUIC impl. includes example DoQ client/server

DNS performance utility with experimental DoQ

EXISTING WORK (CONT'D)

February/March 2021

Recursive to Authoritative DNS with Encryption


Today

- Recursive to Authoritative DNS with Unauthenticated Encryption
- Common Features for Encrypted Recursive to Authoritative DNS
- Signalling Authoritative DNS Encryption
 - SVCB can be used to discover whether name server supports encryption



DRAFT CONSIDERED FOR ISE

Oblivious DoH (ODoH)




Picture from https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/

- Draft co-authored by Apple, Cloudflare and Fastly
- Equinix (<u>https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/</u>)


• ODoH service launched in December 2020 by Cloudflare with partners: PCCW, SURF,

CONFIDENTIAL DNS



USING CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTING TO PROTECT DNS RESOLUTION

- DNS privacy is a popular topic!
 - Domain name meta-data visible on the wire (even with encryption)
 - Resolvers have the potential too see user's entire browsing history
 - Large resolver services are an attractive target (public, operator, ...)
- Protect user's data in flight, at rest, or in use we wanted to experiment with tech that could reduce leaks on the last two
- TEE: environment that enforces that any code within that environment cannot be tampered with, and that any data used by such code cannot be read or tampered with by any code outside that environment [ietf-teep-architecture]
- upsides/down sides discussion







8

THANK YOU **QUESTIONS?**