DNSSECbis Lookaside Validation

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Topics

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- DNSSECbis Data and Traversal
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Introduction

- DNS in 1987 was to replace HOSTS.TXT and allow for future expansion
- Authenticity of DNS data wasn't considered
- From 1994 to 2005 (and beyond), IETF designs and redesigns Secure DNS
- Secure DNS deployment depends on miracles
- DLV is an early deployment aid

DNS Data and Delegation

- Domain names lay inside a hierarchy of *zones*
  - zone boundaries are always at label boundaries
    - but, not all label boundaries are zone boundaries
  - every zone except “the root” has ancestors
  - any zone can have descendents, by *delegation*
  - “root” zone is ultimate ancestor of all zones
  - every zone has some *authority* servers
- DNS nodes can contain *resource record sets*
  - sets denoted by <*name,type,class*>
  - each record has some kind of data
  - NS RR set introduces a child zone (*delegation point*)

DNS Traversal and Recursion

- A server is authoritative for zero or more zones
  - if zero, server is a “caching forwarder”
  - if nonzero, server is an “authority server”
- Authority response types
  - negative: “no name matches your qname”
  - empty: “name is good, but no rrsets match your qtype”
  - positive: “here's what you asked for”
  - referral: “that's in a subdomain, go ask other servers”
- Caching forwarder behaviour
  - acts on behalf of “stub” resolvers
  - caches data for reuse, follows referrals, etc
  - configured to know list of “root” zone servers

DNSSECbis Data and Traversal

- New DNS metadata RR types
  - DNSKEY: public key, found at a zone's apex
  - RRSIG: generated using RR set data + private key
  - NSEC: authenticates unused name space
  - DS: in parent zone, authenticates zone's DNSKEY
- Validation
  - Positive answers will include an RRSIG (+ DNSKEY)
  - Referral answers will contain a signed DS (with NS)
  - Negative or empty answers will contain an NSEC
  - Validator must be configured to know trust anchor(s)
    - ultimately this means knowing the public key for “root”

Problems in DNSSECbis Approach

- Trust anchors are *very* widely distributed
  - there's no way to roll out a new key more than once
  - therefore the number of useful anchors is likely “one”
  - and that “one” has to last for the Internet's lifetime
- Root zone stewardship is politically complicated
  - signing the root zone requires a strong permanent key
  - DNSSECbis depends on trust among root's stewards
  - current stewards are not mutually trustful
- Economic benefits of DNSSECbis are unclear
  - adds value for DNS data consumers and producers
  - adds great cost, little revenue for registries/registrars
  - DNS autonomy means “monopoly powers” govern

DLV Overview

- Local policy mechanism for validators
  - not an IETF standard – producer/consumer “co-op”
  - only affects results that would have been unsecured
- Early deployment aid
  - supports market growth from 0%, but not full Internet
  - will die after “root” and some large TLDs are secured
- Supports/expects migration to “real DNSSECbis”
  - lets producers/consumers have Secure DNS now
  - creates a market to support registry/registrar costs
  - allows politicos more time to improve stewardship

DLV Metadata

- DLV resource record
  - structurally identical to DS RR (differs semantically)
  - RR type code number is from experimental space
- DLV namespace
  - is within normal DNS namespace
  - normal DNSSECbis is used to secure it
  - can have normal interior zone cuts and delegations
- Example
  - DLV namespace at DLV.ISC.ORG
  - DNSKEY exists for VIX.COM
  - no DS for VIX.COM (or, most likely, for COM)
  - insert DLV RR at VIX.COM.DLV.ISC.ORG

DLV Validation

- Validators are configured with one or more DLV namespaces and trust anchors
- Whenever normal DNSSECbis metadata cannot be found or validated...
  - select the best matching DLV namespace known
  - select the best matching DLV RR within that space
- Examples
  - if two DLV name spaces are known, “root” and MIL
    - no MIL name would ever be searched in the “root” DLV
  - if a DLV namespace knows COM and VIX.COM
    - the VIX.COM DLV would take precedence over COM's for queries of VIX.COM, WWW.VIX.COM, etc

Aggressive Negative Caching

- Possibility of MiM attacks requires that validator issue many DLV queries
- Cached NSEC RRs can obviate these queries
- Problem: NSEC isn't intended for negative caching
- Solution: *Off-The-Wire* negative caching
  - the DLV logic in the validator is “like an application”
  - applications are free to interpret cached NSECs
- Result: most DLV queries will be “suppressed”
- Example
  - cached NSEC declared nonexistence between AAA.DLV.ISC.ORG and CCC.DLV.ISC.ORG
  - no need to query for BBB.DLV.ISC.ORG

DLV Operations

- DLV Registry: accept public keys from verified zone owners over repudiable channels; publish
  - should be public benefit corporation with cost-based fee structure, who knows when to cease operations
- DLV Registrant: submit to DLV Registry the DNSKEY values from signed zones
  - submissions can cease once the zone's parent is secured, if parent uses DLV or if DLV is dead/dying
- Validator Operators: retrieve and configure trust anchors and DLV namespace info from Registry
  - monitor registry in case of key rollover events

Conclusion

- Secure DNS is urgently and much needed
- DNSSECbis works in the lab but isn't deployable
- DLV is an early deployment aid
  - should scale well enough
  - shouldn't scale too well
- DLV is not an IETF standard – just a “co-op”
- ISC is committed to DLV
  - will support DLV in BIND9 (9.4.0, due “soon”)
  - will operate a robust DLV registry (similar to f-root)
  - will kill DLV when the need for it is past

Questions

- Who else worked on this?
  - David Conrad, Johan Ihren, Mark Kosters, Sam Weiler, Mark Andrews, and many others
  - Nobody endorses it other than Paul Vixie and ISC
- Why isn't this an IETF protocol?
  - deployment is “just a detail” (ivory-towerism)
- Why did ISC decide to do DLV?
  - our mission statement made us do it
- What else do you want to know?