

### DareShark: Detecting and Measuring Security Risks of Hosting-Based Dangling Domains

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Presenter: Xiang Li, Tsinghua University

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




# **Domain Name**

### >Domain name system (DNS)

- >Entry point of many Internet activities
- Security guarantee of multiple application services
- >Domain names are widely registered



### **Domain Name Abuse**


### Adversaries could exploit the domains outside of their authority for malicious activities

>Botnet, phishing, malware distribution, etc.



Cited from bleepingcomputer.com






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
## **Domain Name Abuse**

### >Adversaries could exploit the domains outside of their authority for malicious activities

>Botnet, phishing, malware distribution, etc.





### >DNS Resource Records (RRs) → Use-After-Free



### Security-sensitive Dangling DNS Records (Dares) → Domain Takeover >A, CNAME, NS

### >Many domain-takeover incidents occur in recent years







# >Many domain takeover incidents occur in recent years

### The growth chart with number of web hosts,a

oupdomains vumerable to rakeoVer

domain names, and websites from 1969 to.


### Narrowing down our vision to

# hosting-based domain takeover issues!













# What is hosting-based domain takeover?

# **Public Hosting Service**


### >Domain hosting procedures




### >However, a hosting service might be vulnerable if:




# **Hosting-based Domain Takeover**



# **Hosting-based Domain Takeover**



### Why domain takeover occurs ceaselessly?



*"Domain takeover incidents are still on the rise, increasing by 25% from 2020 to 2021."*<sup>1</sup>

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### Motivation

# 1. A generic method for discovering third-party hosting services is needed


> Various hosting service types



Various domain hosting strategies



#### > Ad-hoc hacktivity reports on HackerOne



### Motivation

2. An efficient detection system is absent for quickly digging out vulnerable domains in the wild

Large companies have thousands of subdomains, with DNS chains changing frequently

Subdomain	IP Address
enterpriseenrollment.microsoft.com	13.69.233.144 🖸
cdn.microsoft.com	23.52.255.32 🖸
sample.microsoft.com	65.55.69.140 🖙
enterpriseregistration.microsoft.com	20.190.137.40 🖓
event.microsoft.com	23.36.163.119 🖸
security.microsoft.com	52.109.88.132 🖸
mcp.microsoft.com	168.61.188.172 🖸
family.microsoft.com	23.196.249.123 🖸
signup.microsoft.com	13.107.237.45 🖸
jobs.microsoft.com	52.207.139.125 🖸
events.microsoft.com	20.49.104.24 🖾

*How to timely detect vulnerable domains among them?* 

**Previous work: active DNS resolution** [Daiping 2016, Eihal 2020, Marco 2021]




# Can we discover more hosting services and detect vulnerable domains timely?

The domain characteristics of hosting services and the DNS chains of domains are logged in DNS traffic.

# **Empirical Observations**

### **O1. Similar endpoint naming conventions**

### Service Endpoint Patterns




# **Empirical Observations**

### **O2. High domain dependency number**

### One service apex domain may serve thousands of customers' domains

custom1.com	CNAME	prefix1.service.com
custom2.com	CNAME	prefix2.service.com
	• • •	
customN.com	CNAME	prefixN.service.com

DN("service.com") = N



### **Our solution**

Automate the approach to discovering services and vulnerable domains using passive DNS traffic.

### **Our Tool: DareShark**

>A novel framework that can assist in:


>Discovering vulnerable hosting services

Expand the detection scope


>Detecting hosting-based vulnerable domains efficiently

Prevent potential security threats

# **DareShark Workflow**




# **DareShark Workflow**




Part 2. Vulnerable domain detection workflow (periodic procedure)

### Step 1: Finding service endpoint candidates

### Filtering endpoint domains by DNS resolution popularity and domain dependency.



> Step 2: Extracting endpoint patterns via a Domain Suffix Tree




#### **Domain Tree Construction:**

 The root is ".", and children nodes are eTLDs, apex domains, apex+1, apex+2, and so on

#### **Domain Tree**

> Step 2: Extracting endpoint patterns via a Domain Suffix Tree




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


**Domain Tree** 

#### Tree node attributes (Example of Node 1)

Ľ		
	"name" :	"us-east-1.service.com",
	"suffixLevel":	3,
	"DN" :	Dependency Number,
	"subCount" :	3,
	"subList" :	[`a', `b', `c'],
	"subEntropy" :	Shannon entropy of subList
}		

> Step 2: Extracting endpoint patterns via a Domain Suffix Tree



**Domain Suffix Tree (DST)** 

#### **Domain Tree Pruning**

 Prune the tree from the bottom up, by limiting number of hosted FQDNs, subCount, and subEntropy of each node


### > Step 2: Extracting endpoint patterns via a Domain Suffix Tree

#### Service Endpoint Examples

Services	Endpoint Names (endpoint patterns)
Aliyun OSS	alice.storage.com. <mark>oss-cn-hongkong.aliyuncs.com</mark>
Amazon S3	a.b.c.d.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com ab-cd.s3.dualstack.us-gov-west-1.amazonaws.com
GitHub	abcd. <mark>github.io</mark>

- Step 3: Identifying services and checking service vulnerabilities
  - > Narrow down the candidate list of endpoint patterns
    - e.g., remove highly randomized endpoint domains
  - > Map endpoint patterns to services
    - e.g., access homepages, dig through search engines
  - Check vulnerabilities in domain connection and domain ownership validation

### > Step 4: Maintaining a database for vulnerable services



🗢 🔍 🌒 🧃 Create an Ecommerce Website 🗙 🕂				~
$\leftrightarrow$ $\rightarrow$ $\mathbf{C}$ $\Delta$ $\triangleq$ non-exist-label.myshopify.com			\$ 🈹 Incognito	:
🖍 shopify	WANT TO SETUP AN ONLINE STORE?	Sign up for shopify	BUY A STORE	
Sorry, this s	hop is currently un	available.		
Start a store   Ein	d products to sell   Buy an existing on	line store		


#### **Vulnerable Service Fingerprints**

Туре	pe   Response Example   # Banner			# Vendor	
НТІ	TP Response	106	59	48	
Header	"404 Unknown site"	14	13	10	
Body	"NoSuchBucket"	92	52	47	
DN	JS Answer	4	13	9	
NX-CNAME <sup>1</sup>	status:NXDOMAIN	1	11	7	
Default Rdata <sup>2</sup>	127.0.0.1 nx.aicdn.com	3	2	2	
	Total	110	64	51	


### Collecting subdomain names from passive DNS logs

- Legal format [RFC 1034] Domain Names Concepts And Facilities
- Filter disposable domains created on demand
   e.g., scanning, convey "one-time signals" *Total Query Volume* > 100


### > Reconstructing domain dependencies (DNS chains)



### Probing hosted domains to inspect service status



### > Probing hosted domains to inspect service status



rmi.xxxx.edu

mrcd.xxxxxxxx.vip

### > Probing hosted domains to inspect service status

(i) Server Not Found × +	jrzimg.jinrizhuanqian.cn/hacked.txt × +
$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ C (i) web. net 67% $\bigstar$ $\boxtimes$	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ C O $\succeq$ jrz
Hmm. We're having trouble finding that site.	<code>InvalidBucketName</code> <message>The specified bucket is not valid.</message>
We can't connect to the server at web.99lb.net.	<pre><requestid>61D45DE0F15BB23331E7854F</requestid></pre>
Hacked hahaha × +	jrzimg.jinrizhuanqian.cn/hacked.txt × +
$\leftarrow \rightarrow C \bigcirc \& web.$ net <b>Detected</b>	$\leftarrow \rightarrow \bigcirc \bigcirc & \text{irz}$
Detected by our security tool.	Detected by our security tool.

(3) Cloudflare web.xxxx.net

### (4) Alibaba Cloud rrzxxx.xxxxxxxxxx.cn

# **DareShark Deployment**

### Passive DNS dataset

- DNS response data from public DNS resolvers for 114DNS, the largest DNS provider in China
- 600B DNS queries per day, covering 99.9% of Tranco Top 1M domains
- DNS queries originate from telecom companies (e.g., China Telecom), research institutions (e.g., MIT and NUS), and large providers (e.g., Alibaba and Google)

### What did we find for hosting services?

The current practice of hosting services is in a mass, resulting in various types of service vulnerable to domain takeover.

**>** <u>65 services</u> vulnerable to domain takeover threats.

> Vulnerable services comprise <u>a variety of service types</u>.


Catagorias	# Ve	ndor	# Endpoiı	# Endpoint Patterns # S		
Categories -	All	Vulnerable	All	Vulnerable	All	Vulnerable
Cloud Storage	7	7	130	118	12	9
CDN	25	7	247	31	44	8
Website Builder	51	40	156	105	60	44
Others	27	4	462	4	49	4
Newly Discovered	55	19	920	183	125	34
All	88	52	995	258	165	65

### > 7/9 domain connecting methods are exploitable

Method	Туре	Connect a custom domain to	# Services	Exploitable
	M1	Fixed canonical domains	12	٠
CNAME	M2	Any canonical domains customized by any users	70	٠
	M3	New canonical domains customized by new users	12	0
	M4	The canonical domains allocated from a candidate pool	5	D
	M5	Canonical domains containing newly generated random labels	47	0
	M6	Fixed nameservers	1	٠
NS	M7	The nameservers allocated from a candidate pool	5	
	M8	Fixed IPs	8	٠
IP	M9	The IPs allocated from a candidate pool	4	D

### > 4 new threat models that can bypass flawed DOV

----> Normal validation procedure ----> Bypass method



### > Top 20 vendors with 70% market share are vulnerable

0.1	<b>X7</b> 1	<b>.</b> .	Connecting	Vı	ılnera	ble D0	OV	" D
Category	Vendor	Service	method <sup>*</sup>	<b>V1</b>	<b>V</b> 2	<b>V3</b>	V4	+ # D <sub>vulhost</sub>
	Alibaba	OSS	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	86
Cloud	Amazon	Elasticbeanstalk	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	192
Strorage	Huawei	OBS	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	178
	JD.COM	OBS	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	51
	Baidu	BOS, CDN, BCH	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	1,309
	Cloudflare	CDN	$M_2, M_7$	1	1	-	-	543
CDN	Fastly	CDN	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	54
	Tencent	CDN	$M_2$	1	-	-	-	119
	Duda	Website Builder	<i>M</i> <sub>1</sub> , <i>M</i> <sub>8</sub>	1	-	1	-	10
	Jimdo	Website Builder	$M_1, M_7, M_8$	1	-	1	1	5
	Medium	Blog	$M_8$	-	-	1	-	3
	Netlify	Website Builder	$M_1, M_2, M_7, M_8$	1	-	1	1	21
	Shopify	Website Builder	$M_1$ , $M_8$	1	-	1	-	34
Website	Tilda	Website Builder	$M_9$	-	-	1	-	4
Builder	Tumblr	Blog	$M_1$ , $M_8$	1	-	1	-	11
	Unbounce	Website Builder	$M_5$	1	-	-	-	212
	Webflow	Website Builder	$M_1$ , $M_8$	1	-	1	-	30
	Wix	Website Builder	$M_4, M_7$	1	-	-	1	26
	Wordpress	Website Builder	$M_3, M_6, M_8$	×	-	1	1	27
	WP Engine	Website Builder	$M_3, M_9$	×	-	1	-	12

### What did we find for domain takeover?

Hosting-based domain takeover threats are still prevalent.

# **Measurement and Findings**

### > Detection target domains

- Tranco Top 1M apex domains +9,808 .edu and 7,198 .gov apexes
- > We collect 11,446,359 subdomains from PDNS for all apexes.
- > Longitudinal and periodic measurement
  - > 101 rounds (Dec. 16, 2021 Jul. 28, 2022)

≻ ~1 day/round


# **Measurement and Findings**

### > 114,063 (1.0%) FQDNs have been hosted on vulnerable services

### > 10,351 FQDNs are vulnerable, covering 2,096 apex domains


- Reputable universities (e.g., Stanford and Rice)
- Famous companies (e.g., Baidu, Huawei, and Marriott).

### > Hosting-based domain takeover appears frequently and long-lasting



weekly cumulative detection results.

270 new vulnerable domains emerge per week.



#### **Over 50% remain vulnerable for over 10 days.**

# Conclusion

### >DareShark: A novel and effective detection framework

> High efficiency and coverage

### > Comprehensive measurements

>7-month longitudinal measurement on Tranco 1M apexes' subdomains

 $\succ$  Detect 10,351 vulnerable domains (8x more than previous study)

### >Systematic service inspection and threat analysis

Discover 65 vulnerable services and new security flaws

> Receive vulnerability confirmation from 10 vendors, and provide solutions









# Thanks for listening! Any question?

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