Recursive PNS. Is There A Problem?

* We all know that recursive DNS is much more complicated than authoritative DNS.

* We also know that recursive PNS, traditionally, is where you lose money, as it is expected to be free.

* However, to further complicate matters, the requirements on recursive DNS are changing.



Why Are The Requirements Changing?

* Growing amounts of "malicious traffic".

user data via DNS.

* The problems are not new, but the awareness of the problems is "improving".

* Growing amounts of "legitimate" tracking of various kinds.

* Increasing concerns about leakage of privacy-sensitive



There Are Solutions

* There is a plethora of "threat feed" providers. Mostly commercial.

* There are several commercial providers of different types of on one or more threat feeds.

UK, etc).

* PNS4EU is also sort of in this category.

"protected DNS", i.e. recursive DNS plus some sort of filtering based

* There are several "national initiatives" for recursive PNS (Canada,



Introducing PNS TAPIR

* PNS TAPIR is a Swedish, government funded, development project.

* One goal is a national "analysis service" using aggregated data from resolvers as input and generating "intelligence" as output.

* Another goal is pre-packaged "kit" that provides collection infrastructure around a resolver that generates the aggregates.

* PNS TAPIR is not a recursive PNS service.









* All code will be open source.

* It should be possible for anyone to essentially replicate the analysis to reach the same result.

TAPIR.

* It should be possible for a resolver operator to build the local collection infrastructure from open source and get the same result as if using the "kit" provided by PNS





* The analysis service should never see the individual queries, only aggregates.

edge (i.e. the local resolver).

How To Protect Privacy?

* The decision to act on resulting intelligence is local to the

