SIDN

For confidence online

KSK algorithm rollover for .nl

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
8 februari 2024

Public

Agenda

1. Why
2. Preparation
3. Planning
4. Executing
5. Measurements

Photo by Stefan Ubbink

Why?

- Using a safer algorithm

- Keeping up with new recommendations

- Enough support in resolvers

- Smaller DNSSEC answers

RSA-SHA256 failing (0.6%)
RSA-SHA256 insecure (26.7%)
RSA-SHA256 secure (68.2%)

ECDSA-P256-SHA256 failing (0.6%)
ECDSA-P256-SHA256 insecure (26.7%)
ECDSA-P256-SHA256 secure (68.2%)

Source: https://dnsthought.nlnetlabs.nl

Preparation

- New Thales HSM for better ECDSA performance

- Test, test, test

  - Normal run on test setup, using a fakeroot

  - Local DNSviz

  - Lab setup with fast policy

  - Acceptance with real data and policy

    o Memory usage

    o Time needed for validation of the signed zone

Planning

- Based on acceptance run

- Dependencies

  - External parties (IANA)

  - ZSK rollover

Planning

- 4 July: preparation

- 5 July: change OpenDNSSEC policies

- 11 July: Add algo 13 DS to the root zone

- 14 July*: check algo 13 path

- 17 July*: remove algo 8 DS from the root zone

- 19 July*: delete algo 8 keys from OpenDNSSEC.

* dependent on external parties

Photo by Alexander Schimmeck on Unsplash

Executing

- Use written plan with commands and checks
- Continual checking
- DNSViz at strategic times
- Go-No go

When	.nl size (GB)
Before	4.5
During	6.4
After	3.7

Algorithm 8 situation

https://dnsviz.net/d/nl/ZKOoxA/dnssec/

Policy change

Add algorithm 13 DS to root

https://dnsviz.net/d/nl/ZLDMUA/dnssec/

Remove algorithm 8 DS from root

https://dnsviz.net/d/nl/ZLdb4Q/dnssec/

Stop using algorithm 8

https://dnsviz.net/d/nl/ZLuFjA/dnssec/

Measurements with RIPE Atlas probes

- Rollovermon

  - Propagation delay for DNSKEY (1/h)

  - Propagation delay for DS (1/d)

  - DNSKEY @nsX.dns.nl (5 min)

  - DS records @root servers (5 min)

  - Trust chain (1/h)

- 17153 = EC KSK

DNSKEY: Keys seen by resolvers (IPv6)

Legend:
- 6011
- 10212
- 13115
- 17153
- 34112
- 49130
- 49786
- 54293
- 62920

X-axis: 07-04 12, 07-04 18, 07-05 00, 07-05 06, 07-05 12, 07-05 18, 07-06 00

Measurements

- Strange measurements
- Caused by
  - Small buffersize
  - Trying to get key ID from fragments

DNSKEY: Keys seen at ns1.dns.nl (194.0.28.53)

10212
17153
34112
62920

Response sizes in bytes*

| Type	Before	During	After
NXDOMAIN	1015	1402	759
DNSKEY	766	1024	310
NS	1214	1022	928

* Only showing sizes from ns1.dns.nl (v6 and v4), based on DNSviz data, other implementations differ

Change in TCP traffic

- Before: ~1% TCP queries (~359 qps)

- During: ~5% TCP queries (~2421 qps)

- After: ~1 % TCP queries

Source: stats.sidnlabs.nl

Change in TCP traffic

Lack of TCP support

- Increase of 1.6 times

- 25% had an increase of 8 times

- Keep asking via UDP

- University measurements

- Impact unknown

- No failure reports

Measurements

- Removing the RSA KSK

DS: Keys seen by resolvers (IPv4)

No measured impact

DS: Keys seen by resolvers (IPv6)

Trustchain IPv6

Are there any questions?

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Thank you for your attention!