

#### DNSSEC Deployment: Where Is It & What Are the Issues

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### **DNSSEC** Deployment

- Extremely High-level DNSSEC Overview
  - Provides DNS users with the capability to cryptographically verify answers to DNS queries
    - Integrity of information received
    - Source authenticity of the information
  - Provides a 'real basis' for users to use DNS like they do today!
    - Most users just accept and use DNS information without any concern about whether or not it's correct

## Do the Problems Still Exist?

- Anti-Spam and anti-phishing technologies
  - Technologies that use the DNS to mitigate spam and phishing: \$\$\$ value for the 'Bad Guys'
- StockTickers, RSS feeds
  - Usually no source authentication but supplying false stock information via a stockticker or via a news feed can have \$\$\$ benefit for attacker
- ENUM
  - Mapping telephone numbers to services in the DNS
    - As soon as there is some incentive



#### Recent Attacks: Barclays Wildcard

- In this attack, a version of pharming, a user is presented with an encoded URL for a destination, which looks correct on common browsers
  - Is that a bug or a feature?
- Even if users become weaned from reacting to pharming email, this URL might show correctly in dynamic click-ads
- URL resolves to a redirector site in Russia

## URL with Encoded Redirector

- http://barclays.co.uk|snc9d8ynusktl2wpqxzn1a
- Possible solutions:
  - "Fix" all browsers and people against these attacks (and each new one that gets invented)
  - Make the infrastructure generally robust against all redirection attacks
- The second option is best

#### **Barclays Wildcard**


ALCO MARKED ALCOHOL	vacy Policy : Personal Information (new window) - Microsoft Internet
File Edit View	Favorites Tools Help
HETCRAFT -	Services - Since: <u>Dec 1995</u> Rank: <u>34931</u> <u>Site Report</u> [UK] <u>Barclays Bank Plc</u>
Address 🙆 http:/	/www.barclays.com/privacy/per_info.html
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Privacy Policy :	🗿 E-mail Verification - Microsoft Internet Explorer 📃 🗖
Personal Inform	File Edit View Favorites Tools Help
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	New Site Rank: 165891 Site Report = [RU]
	Address 🕘 http://barclays-co-uke.pisem.net/welcome3.htm 💙 🅞
	Welcome to Barclays Internet Banking
	Please enter your Surname:
	Please enter your membership number: 2010
	Please enter your five-digit passcode:

http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2005/03/07/ phishers\_use\_wildcard\_dns\_to\_build\_convincing\_bait\_urls.html




- DNS cache poisoning attacks are an old problem but seem to continue unabated
  - Symantec products found to be vulnerable in March 2005
  - Microsoft and BIND cache poisoning attacks in April 2005
  - DNS bots in May 2005
  - Multiple targeted attacks in early 2006
- Details on a recent large DNS cache poisoning attack at http://isc.sans.org/presentations/dnspoisoning.php





## Where Does DNSSEC Fit?(cont.)







- DNS authoritative-only name servers are NOT required to perform any cryptographic functions
  - DNSSEC records should normally be created with same process/machinery as master file.
- In some environments (e.g., signed dynamic dns zone), operator may choose to do crypto functions on authoritative server.



## Zone Data - Input & Output




mundy@sparta.com or mundy@tislabs.com http://www.dnssec-deployment.org http://www.dnssec-tools.org



**Cache poisoning** 

#### Actually www.darpa.mil = 192.5.18.195. But how do you determine this?





darpa.mil Server



- Each DNS zone signs their data with their private key.
  - Signing should be done with zone data preparation
- User queries are answered with:
  - the requested information;
  - plus DNSSEC data for the requested information.
- Users authenticate responses with trusted key(s)
  - At least one trusted public key is pre-configured
  - Validation done with pre-configured key or keys learned via a sequence of queries to the DNS hierarchy.
- Enables and supports other security technologies



#### **DNSSEC** Deployment

#### So What Has Been Happening with DNSSEC Deployment?



- The European infrastructure services provider, RIPE NCC, based in the Netherlands, has a major initiative in place to deploy DNSSEC in zones it manages
- Details are at https://www.ripe.net/rs/reverse/dnssec/
- How-to guide at https://www.ripe.net/projects/disi/ dnssec\_howto/



- In November 2005 the Swedish national registry (.se) was the first ccTLD – country code top level domain – to provide DNSSEC-capable service
- Details: http://dnssec.nic.se/
- Questions may be addressed to dnssec-info@nic.se



 R01 (http://www.r01.ru/), a Russian registrar, has a signed copy of the .ru zone available on their name server

- ns.dnssec.ru (195.24.65.7)

- Registrants with a .ru domain using R01 as a registrar can sign their own zones
  - R01 will provide secure delegation in the signed copy of the .ru zone
- Additional information on the signed zone and how it can be used can be found at http://www.dnssec.ru



### **DNSSEC** in Asia

- DNSSEC summit and workshop during APRICOT 2005, Kyoto
  - http://www.apricot.net/apricot2005/workshoj
  - http://www.psg.com/~mankin/DNSSEC-Kyo



#### US DHS DNSSEC Deployment Initiative

- DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate sponsors several Internet security initiatives including
  - DNS Security Extensions
  - Secure Protocols for the Routing Infrastructure
  - Protected Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure against Cyber Threats
- DHS cannot secure the Internet by itself
  - But is taking a leadership role in facilitating publicprivate partnerships that will result in a more secure Internet
  - Also leading an effort to sign the .gov zone

## **DNSSEC** Initiative Activities

- Roadmap published in February 2005

   http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/roadmap.php
- Multiple workshops held world-wide
- Monthly newsletter
  - http://www.dnssecdeployment.org/news/dnssecthismonth/
- DNSSEC tools available at
  - http://www.dnssec-tools.org/
- DNSSEC testing tools developed by NIST
  - http://www-x.antd.nist.gov/dnssec/

## **DNSSEC** in the United States

- Formal publicity and awareness plan under development by DHS/S&T CSRDC
- US civilian government (.gov) developing policy and technical guidance for secure DNS operations and beginning deployment activities at all levels.
- The ".us" and ".mil" zones are also on track for DNSSEC compliance
- New DNSSEC guidance was proposed for inclusion in FISMA, NIST 800-53r1

– http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/

## Some DNSSEC Next Steps

- Work with folks interested in deploying DNSSEC to facilitate that deployment
  - Focus on high-benefit deployers as much as possible
  - Improve dnssec-deployment web site be more useable by various types of deployment groups, e.g., DNS service providers, ISPs, user enterprizes
  - Provide tools needed to facilitate deployment
  - Continure work open DNSSEC issues
    - Performance, root related actions, key rollover, zone walking, algorithm & code rollover, application issues, zone operator resources, business & usage cases



#### Background Information and Contributors

- For lots of detailed information:
  - www.dnssec-deployment.org
  - www.dnssec-tools.org
  - www.dnssec.net
- Authors of materials in this presentation (all from dnssec-deployment working group)
  - Amy Friedlander (Shinkuro)
  - Olaf Kolkman (Netlabs.nl)
  - Ed Lewis (Neustar)
  - Allison Mankin
  - Russ Mundy (Sparta)
  - Marcus Sachs (SRI)



#### Questions/Comments....




### Backup Slides for Tools & Applications


## Zonesigner makes life simpler

- One step process
- Default setting does the "right thing" most of the time
- Details of signing operations and keys used are hidden, so zone signing (and re-signing) operations are less error prone
- Easy installation has only a few dependencies.

# Use Mapper to view zone status (before)




# Use Mapper to view zone status (after)




#### Enable DNSSEC in mozilla

000	🔀 Mozilla (Buil	d ID: 000000000}
<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>G</u> o <u>B</u> ookmarks <u>T</u> ools <u>W</u> indow	<u>H</u> elp Deb <u>ug Q</u> A	
File Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Window Back Forward Reload Stop Menozilla.org 2mozilla2in	0	🗙 Preferences
		DNS Security         DNS Security Policies         Require DNS Security when resolving host names.         Ignore DNS security.         Use DNS security if possible.         Image: The security of the secure         OK       Cancel
🐝 🕮 🎸 🔝 🖅 Done		

#### Mozilla detects validation failures



#### Browser with no DNSSEC



#### You Are Being Watched

#### Welcome to the DNSSEC demo!!!

This demo is part of the DNSSEC project at SPARTA, Inc.

Please visit our website http://www.dnssec-tools.org for more information on the latest documents and software provided by this project.

Zone maps for the netsec.tislabs.com. domain can be found at http://www.wesh.netsec.tislabs.com.

This work is funded in part by the following organizations:

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Science & Technology (S&T)
- Defense Information Systems Agency

# Sendmail+spfmilter detects validation failures

<b>(</b>		Inbox for a	lice@fruits.n	etsec.tisla	bs.com - Mozilla	Thung	lerbird			_ • ×
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Folders	V	/iew: All		~				🔎 Subject Or Ser	nder	
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							BOD		10:45 AM	
	s.com									
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		Date:	10:43 AM							
	e	TO: Received-SP	alice@fruits.n F: pass (mee		<u>bs.com</u>					
		Receiver:	fruits.netsec.t							
			158.69.82.20 demo.netsec.	tislabs.com	ı					
	E	nvelope-From:					) record of 'damo	.netsec.tislabs.com'		dation fail
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2 There are no new message	s on the serv	er.							Unread: 0	Total: 1



#### **Other Tools**

## Check Your Zonefile: DoNutS

# donuts --level 8 -v example.com.signed example.com

--- loading rule file /usr/share/donuts/rules/dnssec.rules.txt rules: DNSSEC RRSIG TTL MATCH ORGTTL DNSSEC MEMORIZE NS RECORDS DNSSEC MISSING NSEC RECORD DNSSEC MISSING RRSIG RECORD DNSSEC RRSIG NOT SIGNING RRSIG DNSSEC RRSIG FOR NS GLUE RECORD DNSSEC NSEC FOR NS GLUE RECORD DNSSEC RRSIG SIGEXP DNSSEC NSEC TTL DNSSEC DNSKEY MUST HAVE SAME NAME DNSSEC DNSKEY PROTOCOL MUST BE 3 DNSSEC BOGUS NS MEMORIZE DNSSEC MISSING RRSIG RECORD DNSSEC RRSIG TTL MUST MATCH RECORD DNSSEC MISSING NSEC RECORD DNSSEC RRSIG SIGNER NAME MATCHES DNSSEC NSEC RRSEC MUST NOT BE ALONE DNSSEC\_RRSIGS\_MUST\_NOT\_BE\_SIGNED DNSSEC\_MEMORIZE KEYS DNSSEC RRSIGS VERIFY --- loading rule file /usr/share/donuts/rules/parent child.rules.txt rules: DNS MULTIPLE NS DNSSEC SUB NOT SECURE DNSSEC DNSKEY PARENT HAS VALID DS DNSSEC DS CHILD HAS MATCHING DNSKEY --- loading rule file /usr/share/donuts/rules/parent child temp.txt rules: DNSSEC SUB NS MISMATCH --- loading rule file /usr/share/donuts/rules/recommendations.rules.txt rules: DNS REASONABLE TTLS DNS SOA REQUIRED DNS NO DOMAIN MX RECORDS --- Analyzing individual records in example.com.signed --- Analyzing records for each name in example.com.signed example.com: Rule Name: DNS NO DOMAIN MX RECORDS Level: 8 At least one MX record for example.com is suggested Warning: sub2.example.com: Rule Name: DNSSEC SUB NOT SECURE Level: 3 sub-domain sub2.example.com is not securely delegated. It Error: is missing a DS record.

results on testing example.com.signed:

rules considered:	28
rules tested:	25
records analyzed:	52
names analyzed:	8
errors founde 2, 2006	2

mundy@sparta.com or mundy@tislabs.com http://www.dnssec-deployment.org http://www.dnssec-tools.org

## Check your logfiles: Logwatch

----- DNSSEC Begin ------

No Valid Signature received 6 times

Detail >= 5 log messages: Marking as secure 97 times Verified rdataset succeeded 97 times Attempted positive response validation 96 times Nonexistence proof found 20 times Attempted negative response validation 18 times Validation OK 2 times


------ DNSSEC End ------

----- Resolver Begin ------

Received validation completion event 171 times Validation OK 125 times Nonexistence validation OK received 46 times

----- Resolver End ------

## Trace your queries: dnspktFlow





#### **Developer Resources**

- Test zone test.dnssec-tools.org released in late December
- Validator API to be published
- Developers guide to using the validator and resolver libraries - work in progress



- Step-by-step guide for DNSSEC operation using DNSSEC-Tools
- Step-by-step guide for DNSSEC operation using BIND tools
- Manual pages and consolidated SUM (Software User Manual)