

Privacy and Security of DNS Resolvers


used in the Nordics and Baltics ----

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\$ whoami

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- ▶ IPv6 capabilities (availability)
 - ⇒ ipv6-resolver-connectivity.ip.se A

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- Minimal responses (data minimization)
 - Abbreviated to "MR"

Active Measurements


RIPE Atlas Probes

- Global network of volunteer probes
- Preconfigured DNS Resolvers

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
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Resolver Forwarding



Preconfigured resolver types: $\{A, B, C\}$

Recursive resolver types: $\{X, Y, Z\}$

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RIPE Atlas

Country	+		-	+			#=	-	Total
Probes	109	31	129	13	31	32	91	184	620

▶ 1066 unique probe/resolver pairs

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Recursive Preconf.	Private	AS	Public
Private	4.5%	14.4%	17.4%
AS	0.4%	21.6%	1.6%
Public	0.0%	0.8%	39.3%

	IPv6	DNSSEC	QMIN	NECS	MR
All	92%	87%	70%	83%	78%

Probe/resolver pair feature adoption

Network Proximity

	IPv6	DNSSEC	QMIN	NECS	MR
All	92%	87%	70%	83%	78%
Private	87%	80%	79%	87%	92%
AS	90%	76%	78%	98%	84%
Public	99%	98%	59%	72%	61%

- Network Proximity
- Popular Public

	IPv6	DNSSEC	QMIN	NECS	MR
All	92%	87%	70%	83%	78%
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AS	90%	76%	78%	98%	84%
Public	99%	98%	59%	72%	61%
Google	100%	100%	0%	27%	0%
Cloudflare	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Quad9	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Google Public DNS acting strange:

```
dig a.b.qnamemin-test.internet.nl TXT @8.8.8.8 \rightarrow HOORAY dig a.b.qnamemin-test.nlnetlabs.nl TXT @8.8.8.8 \rightarrow NO dig a.b.qnamemintest.net TXT @8.8.8.8 \rightarrow NO
```

"A Second Look at DNS QNAME Minimization" by Magnusson et al.

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- Private Forwarding

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Cloudflare	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Quad9	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Private o Private	48%	61%	83%	100%	100%
$Private \to AS$	86%	74%	91%	100%	97%
Private o Public	100%	89%	71%	77%	88%

Probe/resolver pair feature adoption

- Network Proximity
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Analysis by country

Feature adoption by country (all probe/resolver pairs)


	Pairs	IPv6	DNSSEC	QMIN	NECS	MR
Sweden ==	304	92%	86%	68%	96%	76%
Finland III	234	95%	84%	65%	82%	62%
Denmark ==	179	93%	96%	73%	88%	75%
Norway ##	165	92%	81%	82%	93%	83%
Estonia 💻	60	87%	85%	83%	90%	77%
Lithuania 💳	54	80%	80%	57%	78%	69%
Latvia 💳	49	86%	86%	76%	88%	78%
Iceland 🟪	21	90%	100%	67%	81%	81%

Feature adoption by country (preconfigured AS resolvers)

	Pairs	IPv6	DNSSEC	QMIN	NECS	MR
Norway ##	63	97%	76%	92%	100%	95%
Finland III	59	90%	75%	73%	100%	88%
Sweden ==	53	91%	77%	74%	100%	75%
Denmark ==	32	91%	100%	88%	100%	88%
Estonia 💻	22	77%	95%	100%	100%	86%
Lithuania 💳	11	36%	45%	55%	100%	91%
Latvia 💳	9	67%	89%	89%	100%	89%
Iceland 🟪	2	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Correlation Analysis


Correlation Analysis



All resolvers

Correlation Analysis





All resolvers

Normalized

Conclusions

- Overall adoption over 70%
- Variation across resolver type
- Google affects public average
- Best Adoption:
 - ▶ IPv6 ##
 - Minimal responses
 - ▶ DNSSEC
 - QMIN
- Feature correlations
 - ▶ IPv6 ⇔ DNSSEC
 - DNSSEC ⇔ QMIN
 - ▶ QMIN ⇔ MR

Future Work

Study Scope

- Longitudinal
- Additional features

RIPE Atlas probes

- Representativity
- Alternatives



The End! Questions?