POPAI: (DNS) POisoning Prevention System

Past & Future

Yehuda Afek, Harel Berger, Anat Bremler Barr

OARC-46 Edinburgh May 16 2026

Motivation - DNS Cache Poisoning is still kicking…

DNS CVEs

CVE-2023-30464
CVE-2023-28457
CVE-2021-43105
CVE-2021-3448
CVE-2020-25684
CVE-2017-12132
CVE-2008-3217
CVE-2008-1447
CVE-2008-1454
CVE-2008-1146
CVE-2007-2926
CVE-2002-2211
CVE-2002-2212
CVE-2002-2213

DNS cache poisoning bugs hits Symantec shops

Spyware served up by fiendish, widespread attack

John Leyden

Tue 8 Mar 2005 16:33 UTC

Analyst Comment

DNS-based attacks back from the cold

The financial sector has emerged as a prime target, bearing the brunt of the impact of DNS attacks.

GlobalData. | GlobalData Thematic Intelligence November 6, 2023

2023

[TuDoor Attack: Systematically Exploring and Exploiting Logic Vulnerabilities in DNS Response Pre-processing with Malformed Packets

SP-2024 Xiang Li; Wei Xu; Baojun Liu; Mingming Zhang; Zhou Li; Jia Zhang]

N - DNS Cache Poisoning is still kicking…

DNS Cache Poisoning Remains Pervasive — and Highly Dangerous

CVE-2008-1447
CVE-2008-1454
CVE-2008-1146
CVE-2007-2926
CVE-2002-2211
CVE-2002-2212
CVE-2002-2213

…oning bugs hits Symantec

cola

The financial sector has emerged … the impact of DNS attacks.

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PoPAI

POisoning **P**revention by **A**uthentication & **I**ntegrity

- IPS/FW module
- Fast & Efficient
- Detection & Mitigation
- of ***all*** Statistical DNS Poisoning attacks
- Past & Future
- zero FN and negligible FP

PoPAI

all Statistical DNS Poisoning attacks

1st statistical

1. Standard Statistical attacks

2nd Fragment

2. Fragmentation attacks

3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

3. Out-of-Bailiwick attacks

PoPAI

__all__ Statistical DNS Poisoning attacks

1st statistical

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3. Out-of-Bailiwick attacks

We do not detect or mitigate Session hijacking attacks:

1. MITM poisoning attacks
2. BGP hijacking attacks

Past

Detection Module vs. Attacks

Paper	Type		#Pkts	POPS
Schuba et al. [12] 1993	-		1	-
V. Sacramento [41] 2002	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Klein, Amit [42] 2007	S	✓	>100	Rℓ1
Kaminsky, Dan [13] 2008	S	✓	$200 \cdot q$	Rℓ1
Herzberg et al. [18] 2012	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Herzberg et al. [18] 2012	S_{Frag}	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ2
Herzberg et al. [43] 2013	B_{Frag}	✓	1	Rℓ2
Herzberg et al. [44] 2013	S_{Frag}	✓	$\sim 2^{11}$	Rℓ2
Herzberg et al. [45] 2013	S, S_{Frag}	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Zheng et al. [46] 2020	B_{Frag}	✓	1	Rℓ2
Man et al. [47] 2020	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Dai et al. [48] 2021	S_{Frag}	✓	64	Rℓ1
Klein et al. [49] 2021	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Jeitner et al. [50] 2022	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Jeitner et al. [50] 2022	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1
Li et al. [17] 2023	S_{OoB}	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ3
Heftring et al. [51] 2023	S_{Frag}	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ2
Li et al. [22] 2024	S	✓	2^{16}	Rℓ1

Past

Mitigated CVEs

CVE	Type	Vendor	POPS
2023-30464 [88]	S	CoreDNS	Rℓ1
2023-28457 [89]	S	Microsoft DNS, Technitium	Rℓ1
2021-43105 [90]	B_{OOB}	Technitium	Rℓ3
2021-3448 [91]	S	dnsmasq	Rℓ1
2020-25684 [92, 93]	S	dnsmasq,Cisco, OpenWRT	Rℓ1
2017-12132 [94]	S_{Frag}	-	Rℓ2
2008-3217 [95]	S	PowerDNS	Rℓ1
2008-1447 [96]	S	BIND, Microsoft DNS	Rℓ1
2008-1454 [97]	B_{OOB}	Microsoft DNS	Rℓ3
2008-1146 [98]	S	OpenBSD's BIND	Rℓ1
2007-2926 [99]	S	ISC BIND	Rℓ1
2002-2211 [100]	S	BIND	Rℓ1
2002-2212 [101]	S	Fujitsu UXP/V	Rℓ1
2002-2213 [102]	S	Infoblox DNS	Rℓ1

PoPAI

Past & Future

- **Mythos-ready for the DNS Vulnerability Storm**

- disclosure ←→ exploitation time is shrinking!



High level DNS request



1st statistical Poisoning Attack



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

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

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

1st statistical Poisoning Attack



1st statistical Poisoning Attack



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

1st statistical

PoPAI Detection



1st statistical

PoPAI Mitigation



1st statistical

PoPAI Mitigation



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

1st statistical

PoPAI Mitigation



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

1st statistical

PoPAI

Statistical attacks

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Statistical attacks

- **Detection: minimize false negatives (FN) & negligible false positive, 0.0076% (FP)**
  (>#5 Packets)

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Statistical attacks

- **Detection:** minimize false negatives (FN) **&** negligible false positive, 0.0076% (FP)
  (>#5 Packets)
- **Mitigation:** zero FN * **&** zero FP

*Assuming resolvers respond \w TCP on TC bit
(all large ones. > 97% [Moura et.al. 21] [Bhowmick et.al.23])

1st statistical

PoPAI

Statistical attacks

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- All together: **zero FN**

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- All together: **zero FN** **&** **negligible FP (0.0076%)**

In conclusion:

➔ Blocks 99.993% of attacks with **zero** false negatives!

➔ **Fast & efficient**

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2nd Fragmentation

DNS Fragmentation Response



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

DNS Fragmentation Response



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

DNS Fragmentation Response



DNS Fragmentation Response



Fragmentation Poisoning Attack



Attacker

Fragmentation Poisoning Attack



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

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

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

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

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

Some Frag attacks correctly guess the IP-ID !!

2nd Fragmentation

Fragmentation Poisoning Attack

Detection & Mitigation



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

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

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

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

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

2nd Fragmentation

PoPAI

Fragmentation attack

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Fragmentation attack

- Detection: **100% false negatives (FN)** **&** **0% false positive**

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*Assuming resolvers respond \w TCP on TC bit
(all large ones. > 97% [Moura et.al. 21] [Bhowmick et.al.23])

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In--Bailiwick DNS response



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

3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

In--Bailiwick DNS response



3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

In--Bailiwick DNS response



3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Out-of-Bailiwick Poisoning Attack



3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Out-of-Bailiwick Poisoning Attack



3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Out-of-Bailiwick Poisoning Attack



3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Out-of-Bailiwick Poisoning Attack



3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Out-of-Bailiwick Poisoning Attack

Mitigation

Client A

Recursive Resolver

UDP !

Rqst foo.bar.com ?

Authoritative Name Server

Rqst foo.bar.com ?

Attacker

3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Out-of-Bailiwick Poisoning Attack

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

Drop all Out-of-Bailiwick responses

Answer: foo.bar.com A 4.3.2.1

Auth: bank.com NS ns1.attacker.net

Add: ns1.attacker.net A 7.7.7.7

Rqst foo.bar.com ?

Attacker

Detection Rule (RI3) – glue RRs outside of target domain

PoPAI Three detection rules

1st statistical

Rℓ1 >5 Catches attack after 5 packets!

- Using CMS, Minimum Memory (~4Kbit)

2nd Fragment

Rℓ2 - Fragmentation Attacks – any fragment.

3rd Out-of-Bailiwick

Rℓ3 - Out of Bailiwick Attacks – any out-of-bailiwick

= glue RRs outside the target domain

Comparison to Suricata/Snort

Suricata & Snort

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- Passive IDSs
- Cannot aggregate by domain name

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- Passive IDSs
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POPAI detection:

- 2x – 5x faster than Suricata/Snort
- 5%–10% of packets analyzed by Suricata/Snort
- Suricata/Snort 10×–20× more False Negatives than PoPAI

Conclusions POPAI: 

- Simple Detection of DNS cache poisoning attacks (3 rules).
- Mitigation - TC Flag →TCP, Data Erasure ~0 FN, 0 FP.
- POPAI mitigates FUTURE poisoning attacks, haven’t yet seen
- POPAI mitigation works with any detection method various combinations are considered.

Thank you for listening!

- For more information
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Open Source code:
https://zenodo.org/records/15688589