Speaker
Description
DNSSEC is not infallible. In certain edge circumstances, DNSSEC fails due to accidental misconfiguration, or failures which can be validated to be not related to malicious activity. Much in the way that "serve stale" allows domains to keep some functionality even during outages, Negative Trust Anchors this may provide a temporary solution for recursive operators in order to prevent significant outages. This breaks the chain of trust, and has significant implications for the chain of trust for those domains.
We would like to propose a new element of transparency policy and/or technical for recursive operators: In these rare cases, end users need to understand the policy of the local recursive operator for creating NTAs, the current list of NTAs and the reasoning behind each one, and the expected duration of this "breakage" of the trust chain, and historical NTA applications in order to be able to audit security conditions in the past.
This talk will briefly cover the elements of policy and possible technical inclusions of messaging (EDE?) and will invite other recursive operators for discussion on this topic.
Summary
Proposal for NTA Transparency guidelines and technical components
| Other conferences? | None |
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